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"X-Spurt" Witnesses
Richard H. Underwoodt
"[Those Rebs] couldn't hit an elephant at this dist-. .. [urk!? . . . . . .
Major General John "Uncle John" Sedgwick,
an expert, just as he was shot dead west of
Spotsylvania, in May 1864.1
I. Historical Perspective
Like Rumpole, expert witnesses have been in the courtroom since
time immemorial. Several legal scholars claim that the Talmud contains
the earliest documented case in which an expert witness's testimony
was of importance,2 and I take their word for it. Not surprisingly, this
was a divorce case.3 It seems that the husband had trumped up a charge
against his wife and had concocted false physical evidence of adultery.4
The expert witness debunked the phoney evidence and saved the wife.s
Delicacy demands that I exile the details to a footnote.6
t B.S. (1969), J.D. (1976), The Ohio State University. The author is the Spears-Gilbert
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. A version of this Article will appear
as chapter five in a forthcoming book by the author, entitled FALSE WrrTNEss: THE LAw AND
LORE OF PERJURY AND OTHER FoRENsIC MIsCHIEF. Professor Underwood is the Chairman
of the Ethics and Unauthorized Practice Committees of the Kentucky Bar Association, and
is co-author of TRIAL ETHics (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1988) and a co-author of MODERN
LITIGATION ETHics (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1996). Professor Underwood wishes to
acknowledge that the title of this Article was taken from a CLE presentation by Professor James
Jeans, which was given at the University of Michigan in the late 1970s. Professor Jeans defined
an expert witness as a drip ("spurt") talking about the unknown ("X").
1. ThE AMERICAN HERITAGE PICTURE HISTORY OF THE CivIL WAR 455 (Richard Ketchum
et al. eds., 1960). For another interesting "shooting," see JOHN A. PAULOS, A MATHEMATICIAN
READS THE NEwSPAPER 4 (1995) ("[T]hree statisticians... took up duck hunting. The first
fired and his shot sailed six inches over the duck. Then the second fired and his shot flew
six inches below the duck. At this, the third statistician excitedly exclaimed, 'We got it!"').
2. See William G. Burd & Madelyn S. Lozano, Experts: Is the End Near for Their Use,
59 J. Ant L. & COM. 77, 77 (1993).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 78.
6. The false evidence was egg white. Burd & Lozano, supra note 2, at 78. The reader
will spot a theme running through the history of false evidence and false witness. Often, the
theme has something to do with sex. See, e.g., CAROL A.G. JONES, EXPERT WrrNESSES (1994)
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According to no less an authority than Learned Hand, English law
permitted experts to testify on behalf of parties in cases in the seventeenth
century. Among the authorities that the learned judge cites is the report
of a 1665 witch trial.8 As we shall see later, modem critics of the law
of evidence governing the admissibility of expert testimony might like
to make something of the nature of the case cited.9
In fact, that some of the earliest cases involved the supernatural should
come as no surprise. One author has observed that
[b]y the sixteenth century, forensic medicine was becoming an institution-
alized activity in several European countries, including predominantly
Catholic countries such as France and Italy. The Roman Catholic Church
needed medical experts to deal with 'false miracles and those produced
by sorcerers' and to test beliefs such as 'bees don't sting virgins.'"
Meanwhile, on the secular side of the street, the notion that the State
should investigate and prosecute crimes also gave impetus to the develop-
ment of expert testimony, as did the role of the coroner." The King
could claim the property of a felon, including that of a suicide.1 Thus,
the incentive was provided. "[A] detailed study of the nature of wounds
arose from the need to establish how and when they were caused, whether
they were fatal, and whether they could have been self-inflicted."
13
I later discuss the profit motive in detail.
Demand for the modern expert witness really took off when trial
by lay jury governed by rules of evidence replaced "[tirial by a communi-
(collecting early cases in which experts were called to testify on issues of paternity, pregnancy,
and childbirth).
7. See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REv. 40, 45 (1902).
8. Id. at 46 (referring to the Witches' Case, or R. v. Cullender, 6 Howell State Trials
697 (1665)); see also JONES, supra note 5, at 36-38 (discussing this witch trial in some detail).
9. See infra notes 19-78 and accompanying text.
10. JONES, supra note 5, at 17 (footnote omitted).
11. Id. at 18-20.
12. Id. at 20.
13. Id.; see also MIcHAEL M. BADEN wrn JuDTrrH A. HENNESsEE, UNNATURAL DEATH:
CONFESSIONS OF A MEDICAL EXAMINER 46 (1989) ("The coroner's office ferreted out suicides
and claimed their property for the crown, acting as a sort of primitive royal insurance company
to help keep the king solvent.").
[Vol. 19:343
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ty of witnesses-cum-jurors" and "specialist jurors" sent out to "investigate"
and "report back."
14
By replacing a knowledgeable jury with a jury ignorant of the facts,
it became necessary to call the evidence of witnesses.
... [Now] the law needed the opinion evidence of expert witnesses
[because it] had restricted the province of witnesses to evidence of fact
because to do otherwise would be to let in a threat to judicial control.
To get itself out of this quandary, [the judiciary] devised a deceptively
simple solution: it made expert witnesses an exception to the rule
forbidding witnesses to give opinion evidence."5
With the birth of the jury system, things really got going. The medical
malpractice expert witness appears in recognizable visage in an English
case of 1767,16 and by the end of the eighteenth century the acceptability
of expert testimony in litigation was pretty well settled, in the abstract.
17
Since then, the devil has literally been in the detail.
I. The Trouble With Experts
Mouse: Who are you?
Fox: I'm Robin Hood.
Mouse: You don't look like Robin Hood, but if you say you are then
it must be true, because Robin Hood wouldn't tell a lie.'8
The trouble law had with experts worsened when the Federal Rules
of Evidence expanded the admissibility of expert opinion evidence.Y9
14. JONES, supra note 5, at 23, 25.
15. Id. at 31, 33. The threat referred to here came in Bushell's Case, 22 Car. 2 (1671).
16. Slater v. Baker & Stapelton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767). The testimony in this
case bore on the standard of care, the need for patient consent, and, arguably, the tort of
"experimentation." The surgeon defendant had re-broken the patient's leg (without his consent,
by surprise!) to fasten it up in "an heavy steel thing that had teeth." Until that time the leg,
which had been set, had been healing properly.
17. Burd & Lozano, supra note 2, at 80 (citing Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157 (1782))
(noting that Folkes settled the issue). In reality, this case "simply legitimized what was clearly
already a long-standing practice." See JONES, supra note 5, at 59.
18. This exchange is quoted in Chapter 16 ("Experts and the Law") of C.A.J. COADY,
TESTIMONY: A PHmOsopHcAL STuDY 277 (1992). Coady cites his source as a "Warner Brothers
Cartoon," but I believe it was a Disney cartoon.
19. See Faust F. Rossi, Evidence, Lmo., Fall 1993, at 24.
1995]
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Rule 702 substituted a "helpfulness" test for the common law test that
the subject matter of the testimony be beyond the ken or comprehension
of the lay juror.20 The testimony need not be "necessary to a fair
resolution of the issues," but need only be "helpful" to the jury. 1
In its application, the Rule expresses an "institutionalized bias in favor
of admissibility that has led one court after another to declare that some
of the most bizarre ideas are 'helpful."' 22 This trend has been driven
by the engine of personal injury litigation on the civil side of the
courthouse. "It is those who are doing the uphill battle that shop around
for their experts ... [and since most are offering "opinion"] ... you
cannot say that they are lying, yet in your heart you know it is so far
beyond what is accepted [in the relevant scientific community]."' '
Furthermore, it has become apparent that the liberalizing effect of the
Federal Rules has also significantly impacted criminal evidence. Today,
prosecutors and defendants rely heavily on exotic expertise if they can
pay the price tag. A new brood of "independent" professional witnesses
are available and are sophisticated enough to know that they can say
almost anything, if the judge will let them, because they "have a Sixth
Amendment Right to."' 24 There seems to be something in this for
everyone.
Who is qualified to be an expert, and how reliable must the expert's
science, data and methodology be? Many lawyers and judges would
probably say that our cartoon excerpt is more than just an amusing parody
of the way that expert witnesses are accredited and the admissibility
of their testimony is established. They would contend that it is a painfully
accurate description of the extent to which many judges have policed
expert testimony. The expert says that he is an expert. We let the expert
speak to the jury. Given the liberality of the modem rules of evidence,
the same critics contend that, once the expert is permitted to speak, it
20. Id.
21. James W. McElhaney, Trial Notebook: Fixing the Expert Mess, LmIG., Fall 1993,
at 53, 55.
22. Id. at 55.
23. Suits, Indictments, Countersuits Spawned by Allegations of False Expert Testimony,
2 Toxics L. Rep. 47, Apr. 27, 1988, at 1314 (quoting Denver lawyer Douglas Bragg).
24. Id.
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is all downhill. Unreliable as well as unnecessary expert testimony
is admitted into evidence by judges, and this "junk" is credited by juries.
The complaints go to the quality and quantity of the testimony, and
the underlying assumption is thatjurors are unable to tell the false pearls
from the real one. 25
11L "Standards" for Admissibility
In a way, this liberality is not in the least remarkable. The fundamental
rule of Anglo-American evidence law has been this: Evidence is
admissible if it is relevant, and relevant evidence is any evidence that
makes a material and disputed fact in the case more or less likely to
be true.26 The ultimate weight to be given to any piece of evidence
has been thought to be a matter for the jury. To be admitted, the evidence
need not have very great force in and of itself because proof is cumula-
tive. "A brick is not [and need not be] a wall.",
27
Why should expert evidence, especially "scientific evidence," be
treated any differently? The traditional arguments for treating expert
evidence differently are that jurors are overwhelmed and inclined to
abdicate their responsibility to the expert, and that jurors cannot evaluate
expert testimony, or, at the very least, tend to give it too much weight.
25. See generally Barry J. Brett, Expanded Use of Expert Witnesses Pose New Problems
for Counsel, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 31, 1979, at 22.
26. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." A leading case
is People v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 2d 478, 165 P.2d 3 (1946), aff'd, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), a murder
case that involved the introduction of portions of women's stockings found in the defendant's
possession and under circumstances that the evidence might have been excluded under Rule
403. However, this concept of minimal, logical relevance, in not intuitive. It can also be abused.
See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 33 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1972); BOB
WooDwARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 224-25
(1979) ("clerk and tell" book discussing Moore v. Illinois). The prosecutor's flourishing of
a 16-gauge shotgun that was not involved in the case was reminiscent of the prosecutorial
dramatics in the celebrated Wallace case tried in Birmingham, England, in the 1930's. See
JONATHAN GOODMAN, THE KILLING OF JULIA WALLACE 170 (1969). The prosecutor flourished
an iron bar "like" a poker allegedly used to kill Mrs. Wallace. The theory was that Wallace
had disposed of it after doing the crime. Id. But the real Wallace fireplace poker was in the
fireplace all along. It had been overlooked by police--they had not really expected to find
it, and so they did not. It had almost certainly not been the murder weapon. Id. at 279.
27. John W. Strong, et al. (eds.), MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 339 (4th ed. 1992).
19951
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The higher the stakes in the case, the more likely the "appeal to authority"
will work. By deferring to the expert, jurors can more easily rationalize
a decision; bear, or shuck, the burden of deciding the guilt of a murder
defendant; or shift a huge sum of money from a perceived scoundrel
to a perceived victim.28 Critics also contend that laypersons accord
"honorific status" to the scientist, and accord more weight to his testimony
than it may deserve.29 Such weight is undeserved "not just because
he may not be a particularly good specimen of 'homo scientificus' but
also because what he testifies to may be much more contestable than
the deferential lay person is inclined to believe."30 Furthermore, there
is that problem of control: the preservation of the "arbitral role" of
the court.31
For sixty years or so, courts in this country tried to maintain some
control by following the "test" announced in Frye v. United States,32
an appellate opinion upholding a trial judge's exclusion of blood-pressure
"lie detector" evidence. The Court opined:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Some-
where in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained
such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert
testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments
thus far made.33
28. See Richard H. Underwood, Logic and the Common Law Trial, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc.
151, 166 (1994) (Appeal to Authority).
29. COADY, supra note 18, at 280.
30. Id. In his classic critique of expert witness evidence, Learned Hand questioned the
propriety of expert witness opinion as replacing the jury. He argued that when experts contradict
one another (as usual), the jury is back to "square one," and is no better off with the testimony
than without it. Hand, supra note 7, at 50, 56.
31. COADY, supra note 18, at 300.
32. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
33. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
[Vol. 19:343
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It is ironic that the evidence excluded in Frye was offered by the
defense in a murder case, that the defendant was found guilty by the
jury and given a life-sentence, but that he was later exonerated and given
his freedom. The expert witness was William Marston.
Without arguing the case for the admissibility of polygraph evidence,'
one might protest that a court following the Frye precedent is applying
a more stringent test then mere "relevance" or "helpfulness." On the
other hand, while a threshold test of admissibility requiring general
acceptance in the scientific community bows in the direction of the
consensus of scientific opinion, the court is allowed to maintain a healthy
skepticism toward, and control over, both the bogus and the maverick.
Whether one thinks this standard is overly "deferential" (the view of
many commentators) depends on one's perspective.
Except in the most spectacular criminal cases-celebrity cases-most
scientific evidence is presented by the prosecution. Consequently, it
is not surprising that, although there have always been a great number
of academic critics of Frye, the test was not very unpopular in criminal
cases. Perhaps because there are a lot more defense lawyers than there
are prosecutors, most of the hostility was directed at the application
of Frye in civil cases.m There are a lot of plaintiffs' lawyers, and
they are well organized. Their argument was that the courts paid too
much deference to the views of the "scientific community" (translation:
"the Establishment" or the "Corporate Power Structure"). The popular,
and successful, argument has always been that Frye might freeze out
"that romantic figure . . . wrongly ignored because he is ahead of his
time."36 Frye was looking "illiberal" in the pejorative sense of the
word. It was keeping plaintiffs' cases from getting to juries. Pathetic
victims on one side of the scale were pleading that Frye was protecting
corporate malefactors on the other side. De Morgan's cautionary words
do not weigh much in that balance.
34. In addition to the policy argument that such expert testimony is "preemptive" of the
role of the trier of fact, some of the scientifically trained critics of the polygraph contend that
the device is no more reliable than coin-flipping when it comes to courtroom applications.
See DAVID T. LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD 224-26 (1981).
35. But see Barry C. Scheck, Expert Testimony, 11 TouRo L. REv. 107 (1994). In this
symposium law review issue, Scheck and others express the view-indeed the hope--that Daubert
will be applied as strictly as Frye, to prosecution evidence at least. Id. at 141.
36. See COADY, supra note 18, at 284.
1995]
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All the makers of systems who arrange the universe, square the circle,
and so forth, not only comfort themselves by thinking of the neglect
which Copernicus and other real discoverers met with for a time, but
sometimes succeed in making followers. These last forget that for every
true improvement which has been for some time unregarded, a thousand
absurdities have met that fate permanently.37
Although there were some notable rear guard actions, Frye continued
to lose ground, and finally things came to a head with the case of Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,39 a case involving the "morning
sickness" drug Bendectin. Efforts to establish that this drug was terato-
genic quickly became a cottage industry, and a team of experts seemed
willing to make that case for the plaintiffs.40 Criticism of the these
experts and the "Bendectin Cases" became the centerpiece of a book
by Peter Huber4' that a very large number of lawyers love to hate.
Scholarly commentary on Daubert has likewise become a cottage
industry, and it is no wonder. In an article describing the Daubert
opinion, one popular commentator charged the Justices with "burying
their occasional logic in painful prolixity.,
42
37. See AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN, FORMAL LOGIC: OR, THE CALCULUS OF INFERENCE,
NECESSARY AND PROBABLE 276 (1847).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, afftd, 780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir.
1985) (holding thatRule 702 permits a defendant to adduce testimony concerning the reliability
of eyewitness identification from an expert in the field of human perception and memory).
39. __ U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). On remand to the Ninth
Circuit, the court of appeals reconsidered the district court's grant of summary judgment under
the Daubert guidelines and affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). But the beat goes on: A petition for
review in the Supreme Court was filed on August 1, 1995. For some interesting perspectives
on Daubert see Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1157 (1994); Jon T. Powell, Comment, How to Tell the Truth with Statistics:
A New Statistical Approach to the Bendectin Epidemiological Data in the Aftermath ofDaubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1241 (1994).
40. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
41. Id.
42. McElhaney, supra note 21, at 54. All too typical of the Court's opinions was Gentile
v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 115 L. Ed. 2d 888 (1991), which,
for a time at least, had the effect of calling into question the validity of state ethics rules limiting
the extra-judicial comments of counsel. Perhaps this accounts, in part, for some of the control
problems in the O.J. Simpson case. In Gentile, the nine-member Court produced two separate
five-to-four majorities in the same case! The opinion was so confusing that one state bar
disciplinary counsel unhappily (but understandably) complained that "[o]ne sort of understands
[the opinion] for about five minutes [after reading it] and then it fades away." Don J. DeBene-
[Vol. 19:343
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Basically, the Daubert Court said that Frye had not been incorporated
into Rule 702, and that "general acceptance" was not a litmus test for,
nor lack of "general acceptance" a bar to, the admissibility of an expert's
opinion. a Nevertheless, the Court agreed that the trial judge should
act as a "gatekeeper." '  In guarding the gate (Horatio at the bridge?),
the court must make a determination (Rule 104(a)) that the expert
testimony is both reliable and relevant.45 By reliable, the Court apparent-
ly means that the underlying methodology must be based on "scientific
knowledge" rooted in a "valid" methodology; or if the expert testimony
is not scientific evidence, it must be consistent with or valid in light
of the principles of the discipline the expert is purporting to practice-
consider economic testimony as an example. However, "general accep-
tance" is still an important factor because it is a strong indicator of
reliability, and in the absence of "general acceptance" a judge has a
right to be skeptical and demand some other evidence of reliability.
46
One would not have thought that these generalities would be all that
controversial, but they are. The "spin doctors" are hard at work. The
Federal Judicial Center prepared a Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence41 to "assist judges in managing expert evidence primarily
in cases involving issues of science or technology."" Almost immediate-
ly, the Manual came under attack by the plaintiffs bar as being too
pro-defendant. 49 From the other side of the field, critics of the tort
dictis, Gentile's Unanswered Questions, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1993, at 28, 28 (quoting C. Thomas
Vasaly, First Assistant Director of the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board).
43. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
44. Id. at 2795.
45. Id.
46. For arguments in favor of consensus and general acceptance, see Richard Lempert,
Some Caveats Concerning DNA as Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend
Bayes, 13 CARDozo L. REV. 303, 336 (1991); COADY, supra note 18, at 282-83. See also
ALAN H. CROMER, UNCOMMON SENSE: THE HERETICAL NATURE OF SCIENCE (1993). Professor
Allen, the John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law at Northwestern University (a certified evidence
guru) is on the money when he opines that Daubert buried Frye and then resurrected it. Allen,
supra note 39, at 1168. He points out that the Court adopted the Popperian "conception of
science," and then promulgated guidelines that, in effect, "restate general acceptance" or "adopt[]
it explicitly." See id. at 1168-69.
47. REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (Federal Judicial Center 1994).
48. Id. at 1.
49. See Ralph A. Taylor, New Judicial Manual on Scientific Evidence Stirs Controversy,
20 LmG. NEws, Oct. 1994, at 1, 6; Thom Weidlich, Plaintiffs' Bar Loses Bid To Sway Science
19951
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system are pushing HR 10, the so-called "Common Sense Legal Reforms
Act of 1995. ' 'so This bill proposes that Rule 702 be amended to add
a new subdivision (b), which would require that expert testimony be
based on "scientifically valid reasoning" and be "sufficiently reliable
so that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the dangers
specified in [Federal Rule of Evidence] 403."61 However, this seemingly
innocuous proposal is also under fire from the ABA House of Delegates,
and the Litigation Section of the ABA is pressing the argument that
the proposed Rule change is inconsistent with the thrust of the Daubert
opinion, rendering expert testimony "presumptively inadmissible.
2
A proposed amended Federal Rule of Evidence 702 received a similar
hostile reception at public hearings, and was withdrawn.5 3 The proposed
Rule suggested (horrors!) that expert testimony "in the form of opinion
or otherwise" may be received if it is found to be "reasonably reliable
and will substantially assist the trier of fact. 5 4 It is hard to say who
is winning this battle.
So the debate goes on. If we are a trial judge or a trial lawyer, we
may be forgiven if we still cannot tell what is valid science when we
see it. If we cannot defer at least to some extent to the "scientific
consensus," then we will continue to bang our heads against what
Professor Coady refers to as a "vicious logical regress."'s How is
the non-expert court, let alone the non-expert jury, supposed to determine
the "expert witness's credentials without becoming so expert itself as
to render [witness'] expertise unnecessary"?" And how are we to
keep jurors from being misled by dubious "evidence"?
Manual, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 26, 1994-Jan. 2, 1995, at A-11. But see Mark Curriden, Plaintiffs'
Lawyers Rap Evidence Manual, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 20.
50. H.R. 10, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
51. Id. § 102.
52. 63 LW 2507 (February 21, 1995).
53. Michael Martin, Admissibility After 'Daubert', N.Y.L.J., Aug. 13, 1993, at 3.
54. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 112 S. Ct. 362 (Interim Edition)
(1991).
55. COADY, supra note 18, at 281.
56. Id. at 282.
[Vol. 19:343
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The Daubert opinion gave us some guidelines.57 Has the theory
or technique been tested?ss Can it be tested?5 9 Has it been subjected
to peer review and publication?" Do we have any evidence of error
with respect to both type and frequency?6" Are there any standards
within the professional peer group?62 Finally, is there, in fact, general
acceptance of the theory or technique, or only minimal acceptance?'
But the real question remains: Will courts be able to fill the bill as
gatekeepers, or will they come to miss Frye?
Many argue that a loose standard of admissibility has had additional,
negative consequences." As a general matter, it may be true that
"enlightening clarity... is to be preferred to an obfuscating precision"-
but not necessarily."6 All depends on which "side of the v." you find
yourself. A battle of experts can be both boring and confusing, and
what should be powerful testimony is sometimes lost in the fog of a
drawn out presentation.67 But this result is not simply a risk for the
57. Daubert, 113 S. CL 2786.
58. Id. at 2796.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2797.
61. Id.
62. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. 2797.
63. Id.
64. See David J. Beck et al., Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility
of Expert Evidence After Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571,571 (1994) (arguing that courts that followed
Frye will get the same results under Daubert, that more permissive judges will be tightened
up a few clicks by Daubert, and that the principles of Daubert may limit the admissibility
of other "nonscientific" expert advice). Similar predictions are made in Allen, supra note 39,
at 1173-74.
For a recent case reversing a Jones Act award on the grounds that plaintiff's "expert" had
no valid scientific basis for his opinion, see Cook v. American S.S. Co., 53 F.3d 733 (6th Cir.
1995). Several state courts have already rejected Daubert and kept Frye. See, e.g., State v.
Carter, 246 Neb. 953, 524 N.W.2d 763 (1994). Some jurisdictions have suggested that defendants
may engage in forum shopping to the benefit of Frye. See LEXIS/NEXIS Hot Topics, Medical
and Health Law, Dec. 14, 1994.
65. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
66. PAULOS, supra note 1, at 131 (paraphrasing Bertrand Russell).
67. The OJ. Simpson case comes to mind. But compare Winans v. New York & Erie
R.R., 62 U.S. 88, 21 How. 88, 16 L. Ed. 68 (1858).
Experience has shown that opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may
be obtained to any amount; and it often occurs that not only many days, but even weeks,
are consumed in cross-examinations, to test the skill or knowledge of such witnesses
1995]
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presenter. The opposite side is that the unorthodox may be effective.
Counsel may be tempted to use cross-examination to draw out the matter,
or to introduce his own experts to draw out a case or to inject confu-
sion." On the one hand, social scientists claim that "lengthening the
presentation"6 9 or adding a dose of confusion to the brew70 may be
a good strategy for the defense in a civil or a criminal case. But there
may also be instances in which the possibility arises that the more
confusing and esoteric the testimony, "the more authoritative it is likely
to appear to the lay person.,
71
One of the most interesting sentences in the federal rules governing
expert testimony appears at the end of Rule 703, Bases of Opinion
Testimony by Experts. Specifically, it states: "If of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence.
' 72
Now, it is somewhat obvious that the most highly trained surgeon
or scientist relies upon all kinds of data that would not ordinarily be
admitted into evidence. The scientific world and scientific training are
necessarily alive with hearsay-lectures, books, the collected experience
of others over generations. Indeed, this fact is true of most fields of
endeavor. Read literally and sensibly, the point of the rule would seem
to be that much goes into the formulation of an expert opinion, and
that the opinion should be admissible even if some of the facts or data
relied upon are not themselves admissible as long as the facts or data
are reasonably relied upon.73
and the correctness of their opinions, wasting the time and wearying the patience of
both court and jury, and perplexing, instead of elucidating, the questions involved in
the issue.
Winans, 62 U.S. at 101.
68. See Burd & Lozano, supra note 2, at 96-98; see also Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy:
Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C.
L. REv. 481, 497 (1987).
69. Gold, supra note 68, at 497.
70. Id. at 496; Burd & Lozano, supra note 2, at 92 (citing Schroeder v. Boeing Commercial
Airplane Co., 123 F.R.D. 166 (D.N.J. 1988)).
71. COADY, supra note 18, at 280.
72. FED. R. EvID. 703 (Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts).
73. But see PAUL F. ROTHSIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEw FEDERAL RULES OF EVuENcE
82 (1973) (stating that "Rule 703 speaks only to the admissibility of the opinion based thereon").
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I recall struggling with the rule when I was a young lawyer, and
this was the way I read the rule-that even if the underlying facts or
data cannot come in, the opinion may come in. I even found one or
two cases that said as much.74 But I soon learned that this common
sense reading of the rule was "wrong." According to the majority of
courts and commentators, the final sentence of Rule 703 says something
else entirely. Instead, it says there is some kind of expert witness
exception to the ordinary rules of evidence. If an expert says it-if
an expert wants to slip it in-then it comes in.7s
Perhaps there are some limits. Perhaps there are some things rank
enough to offend even judicial nostrils. Perhaps her honor will give
the jury a limiting instruction. "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you
may only consider these remarkable and mind-boggling 'facts' for the
following limited purpose. . . ." That is to say, the evidence is admitted
to "explain the basis of the expert's opinion," whatever that may mean.76
This is a rather large loophole in the rules of evidence. Tricksters
do not have to break and enter; they are invited in. One popular evidence
teacher states the point as bluntly as it can be stated: "Sometimes lawyers
even call expert witnesses to the stand just for the purpose of getting
inadmissible evidence before the judge and jury. '77 IS this ethical?78
IV. Weird Science
"I see nobody on the road," said Alice. "I only wish I had such eyes,"
the King remarked in a fretful tone. "To be able to see Nobody! And
74. See, e.g., United States v. 319.88 Acres, 498 F. Supp. 763, 766 (D. Nev. 1980).
75. See Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 1994); MICHAEL
H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL RuLES OF EVIDENCE IN A NuTSHEiL 232 (2d ed. 1987) ("Rule 703
operates as the equivalent of an additional exception to the rule against hearsay"); MICHAEL
H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 641-43 (3d ed. 1991). Fans of the OJ. Simpson
case can now see what the persistent lawyer Peter Neufeld was trying to do with previously
excluded "letters" on August 7, 1995-trying to enter them into evidence through the backdoor.
See also McElhaney, supra note 21, at 56.
76. See, e.g., Engebretsen, 21 F.3d 729.
77. McElhaney, supra note 21, at 56; see also Burd & Lozano, supra note 2, at 96-98
(citing cases).
78. See Terry O'Reilly, Ethics and Experts, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 113, 125 (1993) (stating
that "[tihere is perhaps no greater opportunity for mischief, and again the courts have done
little to patrol this enormous loophole in Rule 703").
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at that distance too! Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people,
by this light!"'79
[T]he great[estl fallacy of all ... [is]... the determination to have
a particular conclusion, and to find arguments for it .... The perpetual
and willful fallacy... is the determination that all argument shall support,
and no argument shall shake, the conclusion.80
A growing number of academic lawyers insist that the most important
duty of a professor is that he "profess" something.81 I admit that this
contention has some superficial appeal, and it is certainly catchy. More
than one member of this school of thought has told me, with an air of
pride, that when they wish to write and "profess" something, they write
what they think or feel about a subject, and then go to the library and
get "what they need" to support their latest passion. As a methodology,
this scheme may or may not result in a product having some degree
of originality. However, such a methodology may not result in the truth.
It is a form of advocacy, which may or may not be a form of scholar-
79. LEwis CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTuRES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLAss 176-77 (Bantam Books 1981). Compare the following exchange between defense attorney
Johnny Cochran and detective Tom Lange in People v. Simpson:
Q: [Mr. Cochran] Are footprints, shoeprints, sometimes not visible to the naked eye,
depending on the surface that they are on?
A: [The Detective] Yes.
Q: All right. And with regard to the area of the dirt in this case, did you take any
photographs or were any photographs taken by you of any possible shoeprints
that might be in that dirt area that morning?
A: There were none there so there was no reason to take photographs.
Q: So you didn't take any photographs; is that right?
A: There was nothing to take photographs of.
Q: All right. So that ifa particular-if Mr. Goldman's assailant had stepped in the
dirt and there were no shoeprints and he left out like you did and walked along
that walkway trying to avoid the blood, there would be no shoeprints for you to
see; isn't that correct?
A: I don't know. I saw none in the dirt.
Examination of Tom Lange at 29, People v. Simpson (No. BA 097211) (Mar. 8, 1995) (emphasis
added).
80. See DE MORGAN, supra note 37, at 264.
81. The basis for this contention is Webster's definition. Actually, the first (Roman) law
professors were called iuris civilisprofessores. WILL DURANT, CAESAR AND CHRIsT 402 (1944).
Will Durant says that the term professor "came from the fact that they were required by law
to declare (profiteri) their intention of teaching, and to secure a license therefor from the public
authority." Id.
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ship. 2 It is definitely not the methodology of science. Or is it? Let
us suspend judgment for a moment. Fortunately, we are discussing
academic law, and not something that really matters.
Law or advocacy, as it is practiced in the courtroom, does matter.
More to the point, the quality of "scientific" expert opinion that is offered
and received into evidence also matters because it is given so much
weight,8 and because it can destroy lives, careers, and fortunes.
There are good reasons why not every ostensibly scientific technique
should be recognized as the basis for expert testimony. Because of
its apparent objectivity, an opinion that claims a scientific basis is apt
to carry undue weight with the trier of fact. In addition, it is difficult
to rebut such an opinion except by other experts or by cross-examination
based on a thorough acquaintance with the underlying principles. In
order to prevent deception or mistake and to allow the possibility of
effective response, there must be a demonstrable, objective procedure
for reaching the opinion and qualified persons who can either duplicate
the result or criticize the means by which it was reached, drawing their
own conclusions from the underlying facts.84
In the context of litigation, the questions that should be asked in every
case are: To what extent is the expert's opinion science, and to what
extent is it simply advocacy wearing a mask? What is real science?
What should we be looking for? How are we to tell the difference
between a scientific expert and just another lawyer writing a brief for
a client, while ignoring, denying, or suppressing inconvenient evidence?
82. Compare Paul Johnson's assessment of the work of anthropologist and "lit-crit" Claude
Levi-Strauss:
Any evidence, however dubious, is acceptable so long as it fits with his logically-
calculated expectations. But wherever the data runs counter to the theory, he either
ignores it, or summons up all his rhetorical powers to show why it is inapplicable,
irrelevant or false. He is not so much a scientist examining a proposition, as a lawyer
working to a brief....
PAUL JOHNSON, ENEMiES OF SOCIETY 212 (1977). Levi-Strauss had been a lawyer before he
turned to anthropology. Id. at 209.
83. See Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Uses and Effects of Forensic Science in the Adjudication
of Felony Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC Scl. 1730, 1748 (1987).
84. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977) (quoting United States
v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975)). Accord Sterling
v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988).
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While the conventional explanation of the scientific method has come
under criticism of late,' even the most "progressive" elements of the
Academy rely upon it when debunking other sources of method and
authority. Here are the views of the National Academy of Science,"6
"present[ing] the basis for the Academy's position that the teaching
of creationism is not an appropriate activity in our public schools."8
Scientists operate within a system designed for continuous testing, where
corrections and new findings are announced in refereed scientific
publications. The task of systematizing and extending the understanding
of the universe is advanced by eliminating disproved ideas and by
formulating new tests of others until one emerges as the most probable
explanation for any given observed phenomenon.
... Rigor in the testing of hypotheses is the heart of science. If
no verifiable tests can be formulated, the idea is called an ad hoc hypothe-
sis-one that is not fruitful....
Creationism reverses the scientific process. It accepts as authoritative
a conclusion seen as unalterable and then seeks to support that conclusion
by whatever means possible .... Scientific interpretations of facts are
always provisional and must be testable. . . . In creationism ...
authority and revelation take precedence over evidence. The conclusions
of creationism do not change, nor can they be validated when subjected
to test by the methods of science. .. . [In science,] investigators claim
no final or permanent explanatory truths.8
85. Popper's notion that the scientific method can be defined by the criterion of"falsifiability"
is a bit pat, and even old hat, to say the least. For sensible criticism see COADY, supra note
18, at 285. However, we should be able to agree on that without trashing the scientific method
or the more general, logical concept of falsifiability in their entirety. Nowadays it is trendy
to ridicule the scientific method or, for that matter, any method at all. See PAUL FEYERABEND,
AGAINST METHOD (1975). The most recent edition of this, "Outline of an Anarchistic Theory
of Knowledge" (the book's subtitle), was recently offered in the Loompanics Limited catalog
(modestly billed as the "Best Book Catalog in the World") along with the Uncle Fester classics,
HOME WORKSHOP EXPLOSIVES AND SECRErs OF METHAMPHETAMINE MANUFACTURE, Michael
Newton's popular BAD GIRLS Do rr!: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FEMALE MURDERERS, and the
cerebral Robert Anton Wilson's NATURAL LAW: OR DON'T PUT A RUBBER ON YOUR WILLY.
Needless to say, I am being methodically unfair to Feyerabend--making a fallacious argument.
But that's okay; I'm a lawyer.
86. The National Academy of Science was established by Abraham Lincoln in 1863.
Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe was--perhaps still is-a member of the Academy's
Advisory Committee. NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES COMM. ON SCIENCE AND CREATIONISM,
SCIENCE AND CREATIONISM: A VIEW FROM THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCEs 2,3 (1984).
87. Id. at 8. Needless to say, not all great minds have been so sanguine about scientific
progress. "What shall we reape by it," asked Montaigne, "but only that we need not care,
which of the two [the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems] it be? And who knoweth whether
a hundred years hence a third opinion will rise, which happily shall overthrow these two
praecedent?" MARIE BOAS, THE SCIENTIFIC RENAISSANCE 1450-1630 104 (1962).
88. SCIENCE AND CREATIONISM, supra note 86, at 8, 9, 11.
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Personally, I am just old-fashioned enough to agree whole-heartedly
with the Academy. 9 I differ only in the degree to which I believe
that there is something unique about science. I would argue, as others
have argued, that all rational and critical thinking can and should follow
this model. Rational or "Critical Man ... does not stand or fall by
his theories because in a sense he has none, merely working hypothe-
ses." 9 That is why one should "watch out for" folks who "find [only]
what they need" to support their arguments. 91
[T]he true scientist is not a man who looks for evidence to confirm
his hypothesis, but one who looks for evidence to disprove it....
... Scientists should publish their hypotheses without fear that their
destruction will be a personal disaster....
•.. Falsifiability is the criterion between science and non-science.
A genuine scientific theory puts itself continually at risk.... Particularly
obnoxious are theories which contain built-in defences against refuta-
tion.9'
One does not have to be a Popperian "reactionary" to appreciate the
notion that religious arguments are self-sealing. These arguments contain
"built-in defences against refutation." '9 Of course, the same can and
must be said of secular religions such as Marxism, although countless
people who have rejected religion as superstition, among them scientists
and academics, have embraced Marxism as scientific.94
89. In one book, the authors contend that scientists do not necessarily live by their own
standards. WiLLIAM BROAD & NICHOLAS WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH: FRAUD AND
DECEIT IN THE HALLS OF SCIENCE (1982). They are as careerist and as subject to financial
temptation as others. For example, replication of experiments does not pay, so it is not done.
All blessings flow to the "discoverers," so the temptation to smooth out or invent data is irresistible
to many. The chances of being challenged or "caught" are slim. Id. at 56, 59.
90. JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 145 (stating that "[tihe correct methodology of science
is the correct methodology of civilization, too"). Id. at 145. It distresses me to think that science
should be considered the least bit heretical. But see CROMER, supra note 46; ANTHONY FLEW,
THINKING STRAIGHT 54-55 (1977).
91. JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 145.
92. Id. at 146-47 (citing KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959)).
For a recent shot at Popper, see Allen, supra note 39, at 1168-75.
93. JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 147.
94. See generally id.
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I concede, as I must, that the scientific establishment is telling us
to do as scientists say and not as they do as individuals. Falsifiability
and objectivity comprise the theoretical or institutional essence of science.
But as individuals, scientists often act irrationally. They do not necessari-
ly practice what they preach any more than the rest of us merely human
citizens do. When the discovery of "cold-fusion" was prematurely
announced not too long ago, a number of scientists rushed into press
their confirmations of the experiment.95 Other scientists accepted the
discovery at face value because the researchers were "good guys" and
"respectable" types---criteria that are not entirely relevant.9' Obviously,
many respectable scientists have been and will be wrong from time to
time, and some have turned out to have been cheaters and frauds.97
[Marxism is the classic example of a pseudoscience, having] built into it a safety device
which in effect transforms it into a closed system, invulnerable on its own terms to
any falsification--the true mark... of a pseudo-science. The safety device consists
in arguing that, since class is the determining factor in society, it also determines
intellectual procedures and criteria.
Id. at 194. Compare DURANT, supra note 81, at 604n. ("Historically the belief in heaven
and the belief in utopia are like compensatory buckets in a well: when one goes down the
other comes up.... [When, in our eighteenth century, Christian belief weakened, communism
reappeared. In this perspective the future of religion is secure.")
95. CROMER, supra note 46, at 160.
96. Id. I could not believe my ears when former Education Secretary and celebrity moralist
William Bennett appeared on a Sunday news program and seemingly accepted, without question,
conclusions drawn in RICHARD J. HERRNSTEN & CHARLES A. MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE:
INTELLIGENCE AND STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994), on the ground that one or the other,
or both, of the authors is a "respected" scientist or scholar. In light of the abuses that have
characterized past research in the field of IQ, one should start out being very suspicious of
any conclusions drawn from IQ studies. On the IQ trap and the odd case of Sir Cyril Burt,
see BROAD & WADE, supra note 89, at 203-11; STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF
MAN 234-320 (1981). Supporters of Herrnstein and Murray insist that they are not drawing
any scientific conclusions relating to the significance of race-although Bennett's comments
indicated that he thought they were doing just that. (In fact, they do, as the second step in
their analysis). There must be a presumption against the validity of any "scientific" conclusions
drawn on the basis of race, if only because race is not a scientific concept. Compare L. LUCA
CAVALLI-SFORZA ET AL., THE HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF HUMAN GENES (1994). In any
event, Herrnstein and Murray spend some time at the beginning of their book rehabilitating
Burt-Hermstein, who died before the book was published, had always been a Burt supporter--and
other champions of IQ, and dismiss Burt's critics, contending that their attacks were personal
and motivated by professional jealousy and left-wing political ideology. They contend that
these attacks unfairly label IQ proponents as racist and right-wing. Some of their critics do
hurl epithets, but the insults are reciprocal. Objectivity is often abandoned in practice.
97. See generally BROAD & WADE, supra note 89; see also E. MICHAEL JONES, DEGENERATE
MODERNS (1993) (hammering on such icons as Margaret Meade, Alfred Charles Kinsey, and
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The questions that ought to be asked in any particular case are whether
the data is good and the methodology sound, not whether the scientist
is part of the establishment, or respectable, or likeable. The fallibility
and irrationality of individual scientists, particularly when holding forth
in areas beyond their expertise, should also be remembered when one
of them asserts his political or moral superiority. These are areas in
which scientists qua scientists have no special expertise or claim to
authority.98
But let us return to the scientists' criticisms of religion. The scientists
tell us that the arguments in support of religious propositions are not
grounded in verifiable fact, are illogical, and are self-sealing. If we
are to be at all consistent, we must concede that much scientific expert
opinion-much litigation science-is based on arguments that are just
as speculative, illogical, and just as self-sealing. In short, much scientific
expert testimony is just as unscientific.'9
Perhaps no reported judicial opinion explains more clearly how fallacy
can be paraded as science than the findings of fact and conclusion of
Sigmund Freud). For discussions of scientific fraud and misconduct in research see Patricia
K. Woolf, Deception In Scientific Research, 29 JURIMETRICS 67 (1988); C. Beth Sise, Comment,
Scientific Misconduct in Academia: A Survey and Analysis of Applicable Law, 28 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 401 (1991); CHARLES BABBAGE, REECONS ON TE DECLINE OF SCIENCE IN ENGLAND
AND ON SOME OF ITS CAUSES (1970). Students of the history of science are familiar with this
volume, which was first published in 1830. Babbage described the arts of "trimming" (clipping
off observations that deviate far from the mean), "cooking" (selecting only such observations
as agree or are agreeable), and "forging" (making stuff up). Id. at 177-78. Nowadays Babbage
is credited with having invented the computer.
98. See MICHAEL WHEELER, LIES, DAMN LIES, AND STATISTICS: THE MANIPULATION
OF PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA (1976). See generally JEAN-FRANCOIS REVEL, THE FLIGHT
FROM TRUTH: THE REIGN OF DECEIT IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION (1991).
99. On the fallacies of "regulatory science"--the so-called science accepted and acted
upon by regulating agencies, see EDrrIH EFRON, THE APOCALYPTICS: CANCER AND THE BIG
LIE: How ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS CONTROLS WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CANCER (1984).
See also JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 90-92.
[l]t is characteristic of the ecolobby, as of most irrationalist systems, that when faced
with reasoned opposition they constantly discard old arguments and replace them with
new ones. Osmosis, of course, is the normal state of invalid theory .... [The
ecolobby's] whole propaganda consists in the presentation of massive series of detailed
figures... the use of figures [being] more a form of emotional rhetoric than an exact
science.
JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 90, 92.
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law entered in Johnston v. United States." This case involved claims
under the Federal Tort Claims Act brought by four employees of an
aircraft instrument company. The employees contended their cancers
were caused by exposure to minute amounts of ionizing radiation that
allegedly came from luminous dials and parts supplied by the United
States Government.1"' After a lengthy trial in which more than fifty
witnesses provided over 5,000 pages of testimony,' 2 the trial judge
issued scathing findings rejecting the plaintiffs' claims'0 5 and excoriating
their experts.'0 The bottom line was that no persuasive evidence
was offered to support the plaintiffs' claims or their experts' theories.105
As the court stated,
[ilf this Court were to accept [the experts'] statistical approach to
causation, then this Court would have to find that plaintiffs have proven
by 63 times certainty that past radiation has caused specific types of
cancer which, in fact [the plaintiffs] do not have! ....
... [T]hese experts' conclusions are not supported by any fact other
than that the instruments are coated with a radioactive paint and each
plaintiff has cancer.'0"
What sort of methodology and argument provoked this reaction from
the court? The judge had much to say about the factual basis for the
opinions proffered by plaintiffs' experts, their statistical methodology,
their treatment of inconvenient data, their responses to devastating
criticisms of their data and method, and their motivation.0 7
In so far as input, methodology, and handling of data were concerned,
the court painted a picture of experts presenting numbers and calculations
that only appeared to be scientific-a sort of mathematical rhetoric.1
°8
100. 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984).
101. Johnston, 597 F. Supp. at 375.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 434.
104. Id. at 415.
105. Id.
106. Johnston, 597 F. Supp. at 412, 415.
107. Id. at 408-18.
108. Id. at 394-95.
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The experts employed "Statistical Risk Calculations" that provided one
expert with a formula for calculating backwards from his desired result-
an exercise in "playing with the input numbers until the output [was]
what [the] witness wanted." 10 9 Duly accredited and credible scientists,
called by the government, produced radically different results using
the same formula.10 Although sporting a "complex mathematical
approach," the experts' conclusions were "obviously scientifically flawed
and contradicted by both common sense and available factual data." '
The court described the experts' opinions on causation as being "based
upon this statistical sophistry and mathematical machination.
1 12
Referring to the available data and studies at hand, the court found
the experts to have been aware of findings that were not to their liking-
and that they did not include them in their report.1 3 The experts were
"very adroit at readily discarding any facts which would [have] discred-
it[ed] their predetermined result.' '114 According to the court, they
exhibited a "deliberate propensity to ignore a large amount of well-
established data which negate[d] their arguments, and they [clung] to
a small amount of highly questionable data which support[ed] their
arguments.""x5 The court lamented that "[t]his is not the hallmark
of the type of objective scientist which a Court can rely upon in a lawsuit.
It is the hallmark of a professional witness who is biased toward one
side of the case."'
1 6
In essence, the judge in Johnston complained that the experts science
defied "falsifiability" because it was lacking in substance and ever
changing: "[T]hey construct their analyses to reach a predetermined
result and will readily discard prior statements that do not suit their
present argument for the plaintiffs in this case." 117 The court accused
109. Id. at 394.
110. Id. at 412.
111. Johnston, 597 F. Supp. at 405.
112. Id. at 413.
113. Id. at 409.
114. Id. at 414.
115. Id.
116. Johnston, 597 F. Supp. at 414.
117. Id.
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the experts of being willing to "say and conclude things which, in the
Court's view, they would not dare report in a peer-reviewed format."' 8
To this court, the plaintiff's team represented the
views of an extreme minority of scientists . . . a very small, but yet
very vocal, group of scientists... that holds views which are not consid-
ered credible by the experts in the field. .. . They have chosen to
separate themselves by rejecting as reliable authorities the very documents
which represent the scientific consensus in this particular field.'19
The court noted that "[when one expert was] confronted with clear
statements in his book which rule[d out] . . . the facts of this case, [he]
either disavow[ed] those statements or he ma[de] a new 'world discovery'
to reconcile the conflict. 1 20 The court spoke of the experts' "intellectu-
ally dishonest invention of arguments to protect their opinions.'121
The court speculated as to what made the experts tick. It noted
that the principal theorist on the plaintiffs' side
has testified under oath on numerous occasions that [the experts who
disagreed with him, virtually the entire scientific community] are all
biased and that he alone is objective and independent. ... [He and
his teammates] have become advocates for a cause and have therefore
departed from the ranks of objective expert witnesses. ... [One witness
went so far as to claim] that he alone is "completely independent" and
objective... yet [he] is working on about 50 [similar] cases.... Indeed,
given his $500.00 per day expert witness fee, one must wonder who
is partisan!"2'
Interestingly, in a subsequent case, a different federal magistrate excluded
the testimony of one of the Johnston expert witnesses by refusing to
admit the testimony into evidence.2 4 As far as this judge was concerned,
the expert's views were "debunked to a point where such conclusions
. are excluded as any reliable source of scientific information. ' ' 25
118. Id. at 415.
119. Id. at 411.
120. Id. at 414.
121. Johnston, 597 F. Supp. at 414.
122. Id. at 408-18.
123. Id. at 410, 411.
124. Montgomery v. City of Chicago, 1992 WL 370144 (N.D. Iin. 1992).
125. Montgomery, 1992 WL 370144 at *1.
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The "field" of clinical ecology provides another good example of
weird or "junk" science. The idea behind clinical ecology is that
chemicals cause almost every disease or affliction in humans through
their impact on the immune system.126 Like Marxism, clinical ecology
explains everything, and like Creationism it begins and ends with
unshakable belief. Dependent on self-sealing rhetoric, proponents of
clinical ecology rely on questionable data, if they rely on any data at
all. There are no controls, and results are not replicated. 127 Although
some courts reject this pseudo-science,' it will not go away. Will
clinical ecology resurface as a science after the decision in Daubert?
Important to note is the fact that we are not implying the experts
committed perjury in these cases. No matter how odd the opinion and
vulnerable the methodology, one assumes that these experts hold honest
opinions (for example in Johnston). Nevertheless, it is virtually impossi-
ble to prove the contrary. Much forensic mischief falls well short of
perjury and cannot be deterred by crude criminal sanctions.
This information takes us back to the Daubert opinion. How will
it be interpreted and applied? What will the state courts do with it?
If judges abdicate their responsibilities and accept unorthodox, "junk"
science into evidence, then they can hardly fault unsuspecting and
unprepared jurors for rendering irrational verdicts.
Now there was there nigh unto the mountains a great herd of swine
feeding. And all the devils besought him, saying, Send us into the swine,
that we may enter into them. And forthwith Jesus gave them leave.
And the unclean spirits went out, and entered into the swine: and the
herd ran violently down a steep place into the sea .... 1 2 9
126. HUBER, supra note 40, at 106.
127. HUBER, supra note 40, at 106. Compare JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 196-97. Johnson
states:
[Freudianism] appeals to human minds because it strikes them... as a form of archetypal
truth .... [Freud's] basic concepts were formulated before [the pertinent scientific
truths of biology were understood]. ... Psychoanalysis enshrines elements of truth
in a false general theory.... But if psychoanalysis is almost entirely barren of true
concepts, it displays a terrific facility for explaining things.... As with Marxism,
it has achieved complete intellectual closure, and once someone allows his mind to
get lost in this maze, it is very difficult for him to get out.
JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 196-97.
128. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
129. Mark 5:11-13.
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V. The Psychological Sciences
Can you imagine anything more horrible than government by professors!
Georges Sorel (1908)130
[Ilt is putting a very high price on one's conjectures to roast a man
alive for them.... 131
While we consider such subjects as exorcism, hunting witches, and
bandwagon effects such as those that sealed the fate of the Garasenes
swine, we may just as well consider psychology and psychotherapy.
Presently, psychologists and psychotherapists are consistently hired as
expert witnesses. Those "experts" have had considerable success
convincing the rest of us of the unreliability of our own eyes, ears, and
memory.
We believe that the appearance of research psychologists as expert
witnesses in legal trials should be encouraged. Their testimony can
be of value both to establish the "exceptional" circumstances that
accompany reliable testimony and to summarize the sources of unreliabili-
ty in an eyewitness's report.132
Are these experts asking us to question the reliability of some
testimony, or are they inviting us to reject all lay testimony? The result
seems to be the latter. These experts have worked hard to convince
us that, while their testimony is indispensable, lay testimony is unreliable.
Making these two propositions co-exist is difficult. Researchers must
rely on their own observations, recollections, and veracity, as well as
the observations, recollections and veracity of others.' 3 Putting this
130. JOHN P. DIGGINS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN LEFr 279 (1992). Compare
PETER FRANCE, GREEK AS A TREAT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CLASSICS 103 (1993) ("Perhaps
nothing in Athenian democracy is more astonishing to us today than that they should have
kept the organization of their lives to such an extent in the hands of the ordinary citizens and
away from the experts .... ").
131. JOHN HALE, THE CIVILIZATION OF EUROPE IN THE RENAISSANCE 447 (1994) (quoting
Montaigne).
132. MICHAEL J. SAKS & REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 191 (1978); see
also ELIZABETH LOFrUS & KATHRINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE ACCUSED,
THE EyEwTrNEss, AND THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON TRIAL (1991).
133. See COADY, supra note 18, at 264.
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aside, how strong a case do these experts have? How strong is their
science? Even if their science and evidence is convincing, how much
ground should the courts cede to the experts?
Until recently, courts resisted any perceived academic take over,134
and rejected expert testimony that was not grounded in "generally
accepted" scientific principles, or that appeared to be offered in whole
or in part to attack or bolster the credibility of witnesses. 135 Jurors
were presumed capable of judging the credibility of witnesses and
assessing the probability or plausibility of the witnesses' version of the
facts.136 Courts reluctantly admitted scientific evidence that related
to the fallibility of eyewitness testimony, and loathsomely admitted expert
testimony on subjects like battered-woman syndrome (BWS), the
battering-parent profile, rape-trauma syndrome (RTS), and repressed
memory (remembered abuse). 7 While the latter four types of expert
testimony may have some relevance to issues other than credibility,1'3
the fact remains that the message sent to, and probably received by,
the jurors is this: The defendant who claims to have been battered,
the accuser who charges rape, or the adult who testifies that he is only
now able to remember being abused as a child, is telling the truth-that
what happened probably happened, and probably happened the way
that they say that it happened; or, in the case of the battering-parent
profile, that the suspected parent's otherwise plausible explanation of
134. See State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1993) (Hays, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
135. See generally PAUL GIANELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE
ch. 9 (1986) (supplemented periodically). For the British view, see Regina v. Turner, 1975
All E.R. 70 (C.A. 1975).
We do not consider that [Lowery v. Regina] is an authority for the proposition that
in all cases psychologists and psychiatrists can be called to prove the probability of
an accused's veracity. If any such rule was applied in our courts trial by psychiatrists
would be likely to take the place of trial by jury and magistrates. We do not find
that prospect attractive and the law does not at present provide for it.
Regina, 19971 All E.R. at 75.
136. See generally GIANELLI & IMWiNKELRIED, supra note 135.
137. Id.
138. Some of the other uses are also said to be impermissible "uses." See CHRISTOPHER
B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 7.7 (1995) (discussing expert testimony
regarding "syndromes").
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events, is a lie.' 39 The jurors are being told to accept or reject critical
testimony-a version of reality-because an expert who was not a witness
to the actual events has taken the stand and said that they should. In
a very real sense, the jurors are told how to decide the particular case.
Since the adoption of the. influential Federal Rules of Evidence, testimony
on the "ultimate issue" is permitted (Rule 704), although there has been
some backlash. Why all the concern?
In addition to the natural conservatism of judges and lawyers, people
have grown increasingly suspicious of the authority of science in general,
and the authority of the "social sciences" in particular. Some of this
skepticism may be attributed to want of education in the sciences, and
some may be attributed to ideological or "new age" hostility to reason
and reasoned argument generally.140 Even so, to many knowledgeable
observers who have looked closely at the subject, research in psychology
is all too often characterized by questionable methodology, contestable
data, and in some cases rather large doses of ideology.14' For their
part, psychotherapists are often poorly trained and consequently are
capable of doing great harm to their clients. 4 2 Furthermore, the phoney
"united front" that commercial psychology and psychotherapy have sold
139. Compare Charles R. Honts, Assessing Children's Credibility: Scientific And Legal
Issues in 1994, 70 ND. L. REv. 879 (1994) (claiming that, while children will lie about important
matters, such lies can be scientifically detected by the technique of Statement Validity Assessment,
that the test meets the criteria of Daubert, and that studies of the technique report "very high
accuracy," approaching one hundred percent).
140. See generally PAUL GROSS & NoRMAN LEvrrr, HIGHER SUPERSTMnON: THE ACADEMIC
LEFT AND rrs QUARRELS wrrH SCIENCE (1994); CROMER, supra note 46. Sometimes what
passes for "science" seems "new age." A recent article notes that "[s]ome of the major insights
of psychoanalysis have mutated into one of America's biggest organized religions-'the 12-step
program me.' Suzanne Moore, What's Up Doc?, The Guardian, Feb. 11, 1994, at 16.
141. See infra text at notes 147-49 & 166.
142. See Mark Hansen, Developments: More False Memory Suits Likely, 80 A.B.A. J. 36
(Aug. 1994). This story reports a $500,000 verdict against two psychotherapists who the plaintiff
alleged had "plant[ed] false memories of childhood sexual abuse in his adult daughter's mind."
Id. The same article reported that a "False Memory Syndrome Foundation" "has heard from
more than 13,000 people who claim to be the victims of false accusations of abuse," and from
"more than 160 former patients who since have retracted earlier allegations of abuse." Id.
at 36-37. The article cites another recent case holding that parents have standing to sue for
malpractice that allegedly has damaged a family relationship. Id. at 37 (citing Sullivan v. Cheshier,
846 F. Supp. 654 (1994)); see also Christine Gorman, Memory on Trial, TIME, Apr. 17, 1995,
at 54-55.
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to the public in general, and to lawyers in particular, has begun to
crumble.143
However, the material sells. In the latest book lamenting the shortcom-
ings of the jury system, journalist Stephen Adler argues that because
jurors often weigh the wrong factors in assessing credibility, social
scientists (by this I assume he means psychologists) should either be
enlisted to educate juries regarding their task, or that "useful information
... gleaned from the academic studies... [should be] incorporate[d]
.. into... [jury] instructions."' 44 Regarding the fallibility of testimo-
ny that lay juries frequently credit, he cites a number of "studies." 14
Adler accepts these "studies" without question, as generally accepted
science based on sound, methodical research. For example, he contends
that "studies show" that "the accuracy of testimony decreases as the
stress level of the person at the time of the remembered event increases,"
that "the presence of a weapon at the crime scene markedly reduces
the witness's later ability to say what really happened" due to so-called
"weapon focus," and so on.146
Now, let me make it clear that as a lawyer and teacher of advocacy,
I pass such information on to my students-we practice exploiting these
points on cross-examination and during closing argument. To that extent,
I too have accepted what the "studies show." But then, I am engaged
in the practice and teaching of advocacy. When I have my advocate's
hat on, I can be brazenly selective, and selectively critical. However,
the fact remains that others no less credentialed than the vendors of
the conventional psychological wisdom can provide us with "studies"
proving that "empirical support for [the stress] hypothesis is dubious,
147
143. See COADY, supra note 18, at 274-75.
144. STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY 208-10 (1994). Cf. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe
of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness
Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REv. 1157, 1161 (1993) (the author stating that he "favor[s] the application
fo clearly demonstrated, accepted theories of social science when they can reasonably be applied
to the ... judicial process").
145. See ADLER, supra note 144, at 209.
146. Id.
147. COADY, supra note 18, at 274. Coady is a philosopher, but the works he cites are
the works of credentialed psychologists. Id. at 274-75 n.34, 39. I allude to Coady's sources
as critics from within the science, since psychologists and psychotherapists (Freud included)
have had a way of insisting (on the basis of fallacy and illogic) that only one who has accepted
their premises are in a position to evaluate their views and conclusions.
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that "there is virtually no evidence for [the 'weapon focus'] phenome-
non."'14 Furthermore, they can tell us that many of the other such
lessons have not been replicated,'149 have been. flatly contradicted,"
or can be challenged because of interpretive flaws that are "endemic
to the research work in this area."''
[The experts have] had [difficulty] in steering between the Scylla of
painful confirmation of the obvious and the Charybdis of exciting
revelations that turn out to be fatally ambiguous, empirically suspect,
or conceptually flawed. ... [W]e tend to get conclusions which can
provide some useful input to policy makers .... but [the use of these
conclusions] in the courts as evidence is likely to be much less helpful,
partly because there is so little understanding of any mechanisms involved
in the gross regularities observed and statistics recorded. ... When
one considers the tendency that experts have, even in disciplines much
less value-oriented than [the social sciences] (such as forensic medicine),
to take a stand on the moral and social issues involved in the case and
to let that stand influence their evidence, one can only view with dismay
any suggestion that evidence from the human and social sciences be
admissible [evidence] as to human nature."5s
A widely published critic of psychoanalysis argues that it is really
a "pseudoscience" because of
For articles for and against eyewitness, battered woman syndrome, battering parent profile,
and rape trauma syndrome testimony see GiANELLI & IMwiNKELRID, supra note 135. See
also David Faigman, Essay: Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
555, 571 (1995); David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense:
A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REv. 619 (1986) (questioning the quality of research
offered in support of a "battered woman syndrome").
148. COADY, supra note 18, at 275.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 273.
152. Id. at 302-03 (citation omitted). Along with sociology, psychology has been labeled
one of the "immature and ineffective sciences." JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 156. Such "weak
sciences," say the critics: (1) lack "an agreed theoretical base"; (2) "the basic materials of such
sciences consist of intuitive generalities which are presented as empirical laws"; (3) they are
characterized by a "succession of 'leading schools', each moving from manifesto to obscurity";
and (4) are noted for the "sinister stability of the[ir] founding fathers." Id. at 156-57 (citing,
among other authorities, THoMAs S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SciENTic REVOLUTIONS
(1962)). On the latter point, see the particularly savage critique of the cult by Michael Jones.
See generally JONES, supra note 97. For an early attack on the methodology, see John H.
Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of Testimony, 3 ILL. L. REv. 399 (1909).
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its cult of the founder's personality; its casually anecdotal approach
to corroboration; its cavalier dismissal of its most besetting epistemic
problem, that of suggestion; its habitual confusion of speculation with
fact; its penchant for generalizing from a small number of imperfectly
examined instances; its proliferation of theoretical entities bearing no
testable referents; its lack of vigilance against self-contradiction; its
selective reporting of raw data to fit the latest theoretical enthusiasm;
its ambiguities and exit clauses, allowing negative results to be counted
as positive ones; its indifference to rival explanations and to mainstream
science; its absence of any specified means for preferring one interpreta-
tion to another, its insistence that only the initiated are entitled to criticize;
and its stigmatizing of disagreement as "resistance," along with the
corollary that, as Freud put it, all such resistance constitutes "actual
evidence in favour of the correctness" of the theory... ; and its narcissis-
tic faith that, again in Freud's words, "applications of analysis are always
confirmations of it as well."
"[T]he trouble with these weak sciences," writes Paul Johnson, "is
that they feel they have to stand comparison with established ones...
pretending to be mature. ... Worse still, such sciences are tempted
to legitimize themselves by taking on practical work.' ' 54  I fear that
the practical work, in and out of court, threatens to affect us all for the
worse, and I am not alone. One researcher tells us that the experts who
exhibit "poor performance" are those whose "domains" involve "dynamic
human behavior." They include "[cilinical [p]sychologists; [p]sychiatrists;
[c]ourt [judges];... [b]ehavioral researche[r]s; [c]ounselors; ... [p]arole
officers; [and s]tock brokers."' 55 Why anyone is surprised by the
list is surprising to me.
153. Frederick Crews, The Unknown Freud, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 18, 1993, at 62-63
n.20. Similar reservations about the scientific status of psychoanalysis are expressed in ANTHONY
FLEW, THINKING STRAIGHT 55 (1977). For his part, Crews started out a Freudian, only to
end up an anti-Freudian. See generally FREDERICK CREWS, THE SINS OF THE FATHERS (1966);
FREDERICK CREws, SKEPTICAL ENGAGEMENTS (1986). As for the inevitable counterattack
on Crews, see Eli Zaretsky, Tikkun, May 1994, at 65. As far as Zaretsky is concerned, "[tihe
current attacks on Freud are continuous with the attack on the Left that began with the election
of Richard Nixon in 1968 and has dominated American political discourse ever since." Id.
The same author observes that "[t]he weakest point of Marx was his claim that his conclusion
could translate into politics in a direct manner." Id. This strikes me as ad hominem, but the
logic of Marx may still appeal to some.
154. JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 157.
155. Anne W. Martin, Expert-Novice Differences and Implications for Choice of Bench
Versus Jury Trial, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 575, 577 (1991) (discussing the work reported in
Shanteau, The Psychology of Experts: An Alternative View, in ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES (1991)).
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The danger posed by the witness of the social sciences is becoming
all too clear, even to members of the club. In The Myth of Repressed
Memory: False Memories and Allegations of Sexual Abuse, psychologists
and "memory experts" Elizabeth Loftus and Katherine Ketcham have
challenged the "theory" of repressed memory.15 6  Throughout this
work, Loftus and Ketcham quote lines from Arthur Miller's play The
Crucible. The reader will recall that the play told the story of the Salem
Witch Trials.5 7 The most apt quotation is taken from John Proctor's
defense of his wife, who has been accused by the witch-hunters of hiding
poppets (voodoo dolls) in their house. Proctor's insistence that his wife
"never kept no puppets" is met with the response that the poppets could
have been "hid where no one ever saw them.
158
John Proctor: There might also be a dragon with five legs in my house,
but no one has ever seen it.
Reverend Parris: We are here, Your Honor, precisely to discover what no one
has ever seen.5 9
What poor Proctor is banging his head against is a classic example
of non-science and non-sense, of argumentum ad ignorantium. "There
must be ghosts because no one has ever been able to prove that there
aren't any. 1 60 This is the quality of reasoning that is at the core of
156. See ELIZABETH LOFIUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY:
FALSE MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 3, 8, 20, 31, 150, 227, 263 (1994).
157. It is commonly suggested that the play is "about" the antics of the House Un-American
Activities Committee (HUAC). See Richard Watts, Jr., "Introduction" to the play in the Bantam
edition, supra note 21, at vii-viii. I was intrigued when I ran across Walter Goodman's observation
that when Miller was called before the Committee he was "decently annoyed at the uses to
which the Communists had put his play about witch hunting in Salem, The Crucible (Howard
Fast interpreted it as a statement on the Rosenberg case)." WALTER GOODMAN, THE COmmTEE
392 (1968). I will leave the Rosenberg case alone.
158. ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE 103, 104 (1955).
159. Id. at 104.
160. See Underwood, supra note 28, at 72. In the actual trials at Salem the magistrates
accepted
the premise that the devil cannot assume the "shape" of an innocent person, the admission
of the so-called "spectral evidence." Thanks to this arrangement, hallucinations, dreams,
and mere fancies would be accepted in court as factual proof not of the psychological
condition of the accuser but of the behavior of the accused. This was, as many good
men and women were to discover, the sort of proof against which there is no disproof.
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this latest offering from the witness of psychology. Yet this science
has sent people to jail, and even convinced some of them that they
committed acts that they probably did not commit!1 6' Loftus and
Ketcham quote from a journal devoted to the "repressed-memory"
problem: "In a psychotherapeutically inspired double bind typical of
our times, denial itself is evidence of denial, the pathological indicator
that makes declarations of innocence virtual proof of guilt."'62
This is a "Catch-22."
Again, the jurors are being told whom to believe. Especially in cases
in which little or no corroborative evidence exists, jurors are being told
how they should decide the case.
There are those who will contest this point. They will argue that
the experts will not actually be permitted to give an opinion that a
particular memory of an event is a repressed memory, or that the memory
is a true or a false one-that is, that the event actually happened. The
expert testimony is only supposed to give the jurors the "tools" they
need to assess credibility. 163 But the zealots promoting the repressed
MARION L. STARKEY, THE DEVIL IN MASSACHUSETfS: A MODERN INQUIRY INTO THE SALEM
WITCH TRIALS 37 (1949).
161. Cf. STARKEY, supra note 160, at 191, 193 (describing women accused of witchcraft
who were "convinced" of their guilt).
It was not uncommon for some of [those accused of witchcraft] to agree after so dramatic
a demonstration that they must indeed have been practicing witchcraft; the difficulty
was to remember how and when. ... Accused women.., who refused to confess
were relentlessly pressed to do so by their next-of-kin. Sometimes this was because
their husbands... "did break charity with their dear wives," aghast to find themselves
mated with monsters.
Id. at 191, 193 (emphasis added). All this sounds strangely familiar.
162. LoFrus & KETCHAM, supra note 154, at 102 (emphasis omitted) (quoting the Family
Therapy Networker, Sept./Oct. 1993).
163. Cf. SAKs & HASTEE, supra note 132, at 191.
We think that the task of a psychological expert, called to the witness stand to testify
on eyewitness reliability, is to summarize the relevant scientific facts. This testimony
would include a few remarks on the scientific method, a description of the relevant
experimental paradigms, and a list of the specific empirical results obtained with these
methods. The jury or judge would then decide the extent to which these facts apply
to the particular circumstances of the legal case and draw the appropriate conclusions
about the case.
Id. But see Victor Barall, Thanks for the Memories: Criminal Law and the Psychology of Memory,
59 BROOK. L. REv. 1473, 1486-87 (1994) (reviewing HARRY N. MACLEAN, ONCE UPON A
TIME: A TRuE STORY OF MEMORY, MURDER, AND THE LAW (1993)).
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memory theory believe they can tell if the memory is true, and if the
repressed event happened; and they get that message across.
16
The ultimate irony is that the jurors are usually left in the position
of having to choose between two contending experts. When jurors
confront this situation, they probably employ the same criteria they use
in assessing the credibility of other witnesses. That is, jurors tend to
pick the expert who puts on the best show, or the one who is most
likeable. 1 We heard professional commentary to this effect, ad naus-
eum, during the O.J. Simpson trial-this expert was "humble," and that
expert was "arrogant," and "this likeable expert will give jurors who
want to acquit O.J. what they need." Or perhaps jurors will pick the
one who comes across as the most confident (the best actor?).
1
6
Perhaps we should add another round of experts to expertly assess the
164. See Barall, supra note 163, at 1486-87, 1491-92, 1493-94. See generally Honts, supra
note 139 (presenting the argument that one type of analysis, Statement Validity Assessment,
is scientific, testable and tested, and consistent with the Daubert criteria).
165. Barall, supra note 163, at 1494; see also Allen, supra note 39, at 1175. Allen says
that
Ulurors or judges who cannot understand the reasoning of a witness can only accept
or reject the witness' conclusions, but neither acceptance nor rejection will occur
rationally. The choice will not be made because a fact finder understands the reasoning
and sees either its cogency or its flaws; it will be made for some other reason.
Allen, supra note 39, at 1175. And the set of "some other reasons" is, from the point of view
of the laws aspiration, filled with unsavory characters.
Since no one knows exactly how far judges and juries base their decisions upon legal
reasoning and technical issues, credibility indices are actively sought as a guide to
whether the judge liked the expert's evidence. The upshot of these signs of credibility
is an ideal type of the good and the bad expert witness .... [Wlitness impact is hindered
by their being overly talkative, making too many qualifications, being slow or argumenta-
tive and therefore unconvincing, being too dramatic and therefore seeming phoney,
and using unfamiliar jargon intended to make an impression, but which comes across
as insincere. Witnesses who use hypercorrect speech are stilted and unconvincing
witnesses. Some witnesses are too short-winded, others are too opinionated, antagonistic,
and chronic qualifiers. The expert, if he is to be credible, must be none of these.
He must have that air of unqualified certainty which comes of having a full grasp
of the case, even though he may in fact have a very partial picture. As one barrister
said, "Very persuasive men may on occasion be preferred to one who is right."
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Cf. Underwood, supra note 28; JONES, supra note
5, at 148-49.
166. Have not the psychologists told us that confidence is an unreliable indicator when
it comes to assessing the credibility of eyewitnesses?
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credibility of the experts. Expert testimony could become a real growth
industry.167
Even more disconcerting than the increasing acceptance of the expert
testimony of credentialed psychologists is the willingness of courts to
admit the opinions of others less qualified. For example, a frustrated
Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was moved
to issue a scathing rebuke to his colleagues when they admitted the
testimony of a "rape counselor expert" who opined that the behavior
of the victims was "consistent" with having been sexually assaulted.
16
According to the dissenting justice's reading of the record, the expert
had only a bachelors degree, and she did not
inquire into the children's backgrounds concerning other possible causes
for their behavior; she did not talk to their teachers; and she did not
talk to anyone who knew them before the assaults. She also testified
that in her line of work she is basically an advocate for victims....
[The witness] admit[ted] that she is not neutral. Further, she is not a
trained psychologist or psychiatrist."6
According to Loftus and Ketcham, the advocates of "repressed
memory" do not offer scientific evidence for their claims.170  They
do not rely on scientific methods. Indeed, they deny the value of, and
are hostile to, testing and experimentation, which might result in further
victimization. They do not even feign scientific objectivity. Their
arguments are as self-sealing as those advanced by the theologian and
creationist. They serve up large doses of ad hominem to doubters.
Says psychologist Loftus of the attacks upon her for challenging the
therapists, "I had to keep repeating.., to myself [reminding myself?.]
167. See People v. Enis, 139 I11. 2d 264, 289, 564 N.E.2d 1155, 1165 (1990) (admitting
"eyewitness" expert could lead to "use of experts to testify as to the unreliability of expert
testimony"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 94 (1995); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 138, at 600; Burd & Lozano, supra note 2, at 77,97 nn.94-95 (citing cases in which experts
have testified as to the truthfulness of other witnesses, such as United States v. Sorondo, 845
F.2d 945 (11th Cir. 1988) (criminal case), and Carver v. Orange County, 444 So. 2d 452 (Fla.
App. 1983) (civil case)).
168. State v. Delhaney, 187 W. Va. 232, 218, 417 S.E.2d 903, 909 (1992) (Neely, J.,
dissenting); see also Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W. Va. 39, 53, 443 S.E.2d 196, 210 (Neely, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2137 (1994).
169. Delhaney, 417 S.E.2d at 909.
170. LoFrus & KETCHAM, supra note 156, at 214-19.
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... [tjhis is a debate about memory, it's not about ideology; this is about
,,171
memory, memory, memory....
VI. Motivation: Ethical Considerations
[During the great witch craze in fifteenth to seventeenth century Europe]
... [c]onsiderable enthusiasm for witch-hunting could be built up among
local officials, since they were empowered to confiscate the entire estate
of any person condemned for witchcraft.1n
"My professional charges are upon a fixed scale," said Holmes coldly.
"I do not vary them, save when I remit them altogether."
173
Experts should not be permitted to operate as bounty hunters. Nor,
in an ideal world, should the expert witness be "for sale." Of course,
by now even the cattle in the fields know that experts are for sale.
However, the image of the expert as a "hired gun" is hardly new. Profes-
sor Mohr tells the tale.1 74 In 1871 Elizabeth Wharton of Baltimore,
Maryland, the widow of a military man and a member of the social
set, was tried and acquitted for the poisoning of her confidant and
financial advisor, General W. Scott Ketchum.17s The motive was mon-
ey.176 However, the defense was able to buy a spectacular array of
medical witnesses to attack the prosecuting expert, 77 and to successfully
portray the case as something of a "rush to judgment" by a Baltimore
171. Id. at 213 (emphasis omitted); see also David Ross, Understanding the Child Witness:
Implications for Investigating Child Abuse (Video--California Legal Education Services).
This video seminar for lawyers illustrates how the testimony of the child witness can be affected
by irresponsible interviewers. Ross also examines repressed memory theory, and argues that
the theory is being incorporated into law before it has been shown to have sufficient empirical
basis. Like other critics of repressed memory theory, he argues that the techniques that are
used to elicit a "repressed memory" can instead implant a false memory.
172. See MARVIN HARRIS, Cows, PIGS, WARS AND WITCHES: THE RIDDLES OF CULTURE
207, 215 (1974).
173. Sm ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Thor Bridge, in THE CASE-BOOK OF SHERLOCK HOLMES
29 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994).
174. See JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAw: MEDICAL JURISPRuDENCE IN NNEIEENh-
CENTURY AMERICA 187-96 (1993).
175. Id. at 187, 192.
176. Id. at 187.
177. Id. at 191-95.
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law enforcement establishment led by an officer "who, like all of his
class, was eager to bag his game."'" This story has a familiar ring.
By the time of the Wharton trial, public opinion was already turning
against expert witnesses, and Bar Associations were heard to complain
of a growing cottage industry and a society of professional witnesses.179
Lawyer Tutt described the dirty dealings between his unscrupulous senior
partner and a gang of psychiatric highbinders:
"I don't see why it's any worse in principle for us than for you," retorted
[the expert witness] coolly. "If it's ethical for a lawyer to take a
contingent fee, why shouldn't it be for a doctor?"... "It's agreed,
then, that if the will is denied probate, [your expert witnesses] are to
receive collectively a sum equal to fifteen per cent of [the lawyers']
gross fee, without any deduction for expenses?" "Correct!" replied
[the senior lawyer]. "It's a bargain!" ... "Want to look at the hypothet-
ical [question you will be asked to testify to]?" inquired [the senior
lawyer], patting his breast-pocket. "No, not now!" [the expert witness]
waved the suggestion aside as unimportant. ... I could not believe
that I had heard truly. Was this freebooter in broadcloth and white
linen, who had just sold himself and his band [of supporting expert
witnesses] for a contingent interest in the swag, about to instruct them
how to perpetrate the crime and dispose of the body? In what way
did the present proceeding differ from the hiring of a mob of gangsters
to commit a robbery? In none, essentially, save that these were soft-
voiced crooks who took no chances of putting their heads in a noose,
and, instead of wearing black masks, disguised themselves as learned
men. What was this but one more instance of the universal truth that
what passes for respectability is often nothing but crime in a clean
collar?'"
Today the sheer volume of the piece work has caused the walls of
the cottage to bulge and burst. Examine a copy of Trial magazine, 8'
and you will find page after page of advertisements purchased by
professional witnesses seeking work. And the contingency fee issue
has not gone away. Indeed, it has even turned up on the criminal side
of the street."' 2 Of course, this is not surprising in a system that gives
178. Id. at 191.
179. See id. at 199.
180. YANKEE LAWYER: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF EPHRAIM Turr 182-85 (1943).
181. Trial Magazine is published by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.
182. See United States v. Solorio, 53 F.3d 341 (9th Cir. 1995) (dealing with a sting operation
that employed an informer under a contingent fee arrangement that gave the informer incentives
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law enforcement agencies a direct interest in whatever they can seize
in their war on drugs, or war on whatever else. Holmes would be
scandalized.
Even without contingency fees, many social scientists, psychologists,
and other assorted behaviorists are ready to drop even the pretense of
objectivity, and justify the expert witness as advocate. It is an adversary
system, they say, so why should the lawyers have all the fun and profit?
"Each individual [psychologist] can decide what strategy best suits him
or her, and let the survival of the fittest expert prevail. ' ' 1s3
The iruly qualified expert who has become an advocate is uncontrollable,
particularly if he or she is a disciple of Dr. Loftus. Although good
preparation can snare an expert with prior inconsistent testimony, the
truth is that these moments are rare. The [truly] skilled expert.., does
not step blindly into falsity. All he has to do is champion a minority
opinion, sliding glibly through cross-examination with semantic shields.
The words "not necessarily" should probably be inscribed on every
expert's tombstone.'"
The American Bar Association did not help matters much when it
released an informal opinion in 1976 that approved of the lawyer
recommending to the client the use of a medical-legal consultant on
a contingent fee basis.1ls It did not take long for the experts to begin
lobbying (a polite word for everything from inquiries to threats of
litigation) state bar committees for similar blessings.1 ' The adoption
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct did not help. Rule 3.4(b)
says only that a lawyer shall not "offer an inducement to a witness that
is prohibited by law,"187 although a Comment to the Rule conceded
that "[t]he common law rule in most jurisdictions is that... it is improper
to fabricate evidence, said to involve "outrageous government conduct" in violation of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause).
183. O'Reilly, supra note 78, at 117 (quoting Elizabeth F. Loftus, Experimental Psychologist
as Advocate or Impartial Educator, 10 LAw & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 63, 71 (1986)). O'Reilly
seems genuinely shocked by "forensic social science" and an adversary model for the behavioral
experL Id. at 114-19.
184. O'Reilly, supra note 78, at 119.
185. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1375 (1976).
186. For a state bar opinion rejecting such overtures see Kentucky Bar Op. E-276 (1983).
187. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) (1993).
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to pay an expert witness a contingent fee."'8 In 1987 the ABA Com-
mittee essentially took it all back with the release of Formal Opinion
87-354, which finally conceded that contingency fees for expert witnesses
might be an "improper inducement," might impede the lawyer's ability
to exercise "independent judgment," and might raise "possible questions
of champerty."' 8 9 The 1976 informal opinion was "withdrawn." It
is of interest that the American Medical Association (in this context
a source that is not exactly disinterested) had issued a similar opinion
on the issue of contingent physician's fees:' 90
If a physician's fee for medical service is contingent on the successful
outcome of a claim,.. .there is the ever-present danger that the physician
may become less of a healer and more of an advocate.... Accordingly,
a physician's fee for medical services should be based on the value
of the service provided by the physician to the patient and not on the
uncertain outcome of a contingency that does not in any way relate
to the value of the medical service."'
Today, medical experts in civil (tort) cases can do well even without
contingency fee contracts or "bonuses." During a recent lawsuit in
Louisville, Kentucky against the manufacturers of Prozac, the psychiatric
expert witnesses for the plaintiff and the defendant were each paid
between $40,000 and $50,000 for their work.192  The lawsuit was
brought by the survivors of eight people who were killed, and by twelve
people who were wounded, by the assault-rifle toting Joseph Wesbecker,
in a shooting spree at Standard Gravure Co. on September 14, 1989.193
The plaintiffs contended that the shooting was caused by Wesbecker's
use of Prozac.194 And in the O.J. Simpson case, former New York
188. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 3.4(b) cmt. 3 (1993).
189. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-354 (1987);
see also Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 554 F.2d 534 (DR 7-109(C), which
prohibited contingent fees for experts, held to be constitutional), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924
(1977); Dupree v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 179 Mich. App. 254, 445 N.W.2d 498 (1989)
(holding a contract with expert witness broker on contingency fee basis void on public policy
grounds).
190. CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 304 (Rena Gorlin ed., 3d ed. 1994).
191. Id.
192. Leslie Scanlon, Witness says 'Life Patterns' Led Wesbecker to Kill, THE CoURIER-
JOURNAL, Dec. 2, 1994, at B3.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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City Medical Examiner and now freelancing Dr. Michael Baden testified
that as of the first day of cross-examination he had billed in excess of
$100,000.19 s This is not "chump change"--not even in Los Angeles.
Ironically, the greatest fight in medical jurisprudence in the mid-
nineteenth century may have been fought over the right of medical
professionals to any compensation for time spent in the courts and in
public inquiries when called on behalf of the state. Prosecutors and
judges seized physicians' professional knowledge, their capital in business,
with the subpoena and scourged resistors with the lash of the contempt
power.'96 A hint of the same sort of legal imperialism can be found
in a 1993 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45(c)(3)(B)(ii).1
97
VII. Forensic Medicine
"There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact," [Holmes]
answered, laughing."
Since the earliest days of the American republic, conscientious
members of the medical profession have tried to contribute to the truth-
finding process.199 Indeed, American physicians were pioneers in
the field of forensic medicine and medical jurisprudence. 2"
195. Tim Rutten & Jim Newton, Pathologist for Defense Rebuts Work by Coroner; Simpson
Trial: Baden Questions Procedures and Findings About Timing and Method of Murders, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at B1.
196. See, e.g., MOHR, supra note 174, at 201.
197. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) (purporting to authorize a lawyer in a civil case
to subpoena the testimony of a expert, although the lawyer has not retained that expert. The
court may move to quash or modify the subpoena and request that the expert be "reasonably
compensated"). Cf. Mount Sinai Sch. of Medicine v. American Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520
(2d Cir. 1989) (compelling researchers who had not been part of the litigation to turn over
their "raw data" to the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's compensated expert relied
on their published findings). The notion seems to be that the academic, the scientist, and the
medical researcher are public utilities at the service of the lawyer and his client. Granted,
the new Rule contains a provision for some compensation, but it does not recognize other important
interests that might be at stake.
198. SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Boscombe Valley Mystery, in THE ADVENTURES
OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 65 (Tom Doherty Assocs. 1988).
199. See generally MOHR, supra note 174.
200. See generally id.
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Alas, all too often good intentions, and in a distressing number of
cases even good instincts and good science, have gone for naught. The
history of forensic medicine provides us with many examples of the
truthful witness vilified and the false witness exalted. As we watch
the television news coverage of the latest celebrity murder, as we listen
to the blow by blow commentary, and as we watch counsel for the defense
castigating the coroner or medical examiner for botching the case, we
would do well to keep this in mind.
The 1869 trial of twenty-seven-year-old Dr. Paul Schoeppe for the
murder of elderly Maria Stennecke is a fascinating case in point.
201
Stennecke was a spinster nearly seventy years of age when she struck
up a relationship with Schoeppe, a German immigrant and newcomer
to the community.2 2 When Stennecke died in 1869, Schoeppe produced
a will naming him as her sole beneficiary. 20 3 This will differed radically
from an earlier will, and by every appearance it was a rather clumsy
forgery.04 Gossip solidified into suspicion when Schoeppe began
asking questions "about how long after burial various substances might
still be detected. '2 5 Schoeppe was indicted, and the body was exhumed
for autopsy.206 The deceased's stomach was removed and sent to
Professor William Aiken of the University of Maryland, a teacher of
medical chemistry.2 7 Aiken satisfied himself that Stennecke had died
of prussic (hydrocyanic) acid poisoning. 208 Schoeppe had purchased
a quantity of the poison shortly before Stennecke's death. 20 9 The
prosecutor had a case. 0
This case is all the more fascinating because, even in these early
days, the defendant's fortunes turned on a battle of experts as well as
201. Id. at 180-87.
202. Id. at 180.
203. Id. at 180-81.
204. MOHR, supra note 174, at 181.
205. Id. at 182.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. MOHR, supra note 174, at 182.
210. Id.
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the ebb and flow of popular prejudice. Aiken's procedures left something
to be desired, and provided opportunities for the defense lawyers, who
relied upon the services or Dr. T.G. Wormley of the faculty of Starling
Medical College in Columbus, Ohio.2 1 1 The jury sided with Aiken
and voted to convict, but sufficient doubts were raised so as to arouse
the attention of other physicians. 21 2 For a variety of reasons, among
them professional self-interest, Aiken became a target.213 Whether
or not Schoeppe was one of the guild, the case had not been air-tight,
and a mid-century malpractice crisis inclined physicians to rally behind
Schoeppe as the aggrieved party.214 "[P]hysicians were reluctant to
support murder charges associated with the loss of a patient unless the
evidence was absolutely iron-clad,"2 '5 and experts from as far away
as Yale and Harvard began to second guess poor Aiken and bombard
the Pennsylvania Governor for a pardon or, at the very least, a new
trial.21 6 More effective pressure was brought to bear by the sizable
German population of the Commonwealth. 21 7 The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court did not succumb to popular pressure and affirmed Schoeppe's
21conviction. 18 But the legislature passed a remarkable law authorizing
a second trial before a new judge .2 9 Aiken's testimony was severely
limited in the rematch, and he lost the second battle of the experts.
2 2
The prosecutor's forensic expert was "mugged" by a gang of his own
professional colleagues.2
Schoeppe was acquitted and his death warrant was lifted.222 Like
many a latter day scoundrel or political cat-burglar, he immediately
211. Id.
212. Id. at 182-83.
213. Id. at 183.
214. MOHR, supra note 174, at 183.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 184.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 185.
219. MOHR, supra note 174, at 185.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 185-86.
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took to the lecture circuit.223 Schoeppe also continued to press his
claim under the disputed will. 24 Perhaps Schoeppe should have kept
a lower profile. Nevertheless, the reversal of his fortune was short-lived.
He was arrested for another forgery in Illinois, and soon it was discovered
that he had fled his native Prussia after being convicted of a similar
offense.22 His medical credentials turned out to be fraudulent as
well.2 6
Not only was Herr Doctor Schoeppe undone in the end, but so were
all the experts. Aiken had been beaten down by his peers, who in turn
"ended up after the fact looking like obfuscators and defenders of one
of their own rather than champions of justice. ' '2 7 This historical foot-
note is offered to keep things in perspective, not to suggest that medical
witnesses for the prosecution are always pure.
Professor of Law and forensic scientist Andre Moenssens recently
offered a list of nine reasons to be cautious in accepting medical and
other scientific evidence in criminal cases.228 These reasons provide
a nice checklist for the cross-examiner. First of all, many, if not most,
expert witnesses are technicians-mere "bench operators" who have
only a limited understanding of the theory and instrumentation that they
are trying to apply.2 29 Second, most forensic laboratories are owned
or controlled by the state and have a pro-prosecution bias. M  This
fact has been noted in Great Britain as well as in the United States.231
Third, experts regularly stray beyond their expertise when giving
testimony and are seldom challenged when they do. 2 As an example,
223. Id. at 186.
224. MOHR, supra note 174, at 186.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 187.
228. Andre Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence In Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution,
84 J. CRim. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 1 (1993).
229. Id. at 5-6.
230. Id. at 6-7.
231. See JONES, supra note 5, at 194-95. For an interesting decision that held that an
independent forensic pathologist had to be appointed to assist an indigent murder defendant,
see Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
232. Moenssens, supra note 228, at 7-9.
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Professor Moenssens cites a case in which a pathologist was permitted
to testify, or guess, at the caliber of a bullet from the examination of
a wound, although there was no showing that the pathologist had any
training in firearms or other basis for giving the opinion. This type
of situation is not unusual. Moenssens suggests that most lawyers and
judges are too scientifically illiterate to mount meaningful challenges
to these experts' testimony, even when that testimony strays.
234
"[Wlhen it [comes] to ... scientific and mathematical testimony, the
adversary system ceas[es] to exist and the evidence [is] not challenged.
The cross-examination of the forensic scientist [may be] without
point. ' 2- This point relates back to the second point, too, because
[t]he problem in criminal cases... is that the prosecution, unlike the
defendant, has ready access to expert witnesses and fabulous laboratory
facilities. Thus, a surprising number of novel techniques gain admissi-
bility without the presentation of defense expert testimony because a
criminal defendant often cannot afford to hire even a good Zulu witch
doctor, whose fees and travel costs would exceed guidelines for such
things . '
The fourth reason for caution is that experts often lie about their creden-
tials and get away with it.237 Fifth, crime laboratories may not be
very good at what they do.23s Studies of the accuracy of forensic
laboratories have documented error rates as high as seventy and seventy-
233. Id. at 8, 21 n.22 (citing Lee v. State, 661 P.2d 1345, 1354 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983)).
234. Id. at 10.
235. Randolph Jonakait, Stories, Forensic Science, and Improved Verdicts, 13 CARDOZO
L. REv. 343, 348 (1991).
236. Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W. Va. 39,54,443 S.E.2d 196,211 (1993) (Neely, J., concurring)
(emphasis added), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2137 (1994).
237. Moenssens, supra note 228, at 9-10. Professor Moenssens cites a number of cases
in which "experts" with phony credentials testified in high profile cases like the Ted Bundy
prosecution and the Love Canal litigation (for the government). Id. at 21 n.28 (citing James
Starrs, Mountebanks Among Forensic Scientists, 2 FORENsIC SCIENCE HANDBOOK (Richard
Saferstein ed., 1988) as "a veritable catalogue of some clearly documented cases including
FBI and police crime laboratory 'experts"'). Dr. Michael Baden describes how one of the
prosecution's experts in the second Claus Von Bulow trial tripped over his own resume. BADEN
wrmH HENNESSEE, supra note 13, at 192-93. Reference is made to the perjury of an expert
witness in the Kentucky case of Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 803 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1990), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 844 (1991).
238. Moenssens, supra note 228, at 10-12.
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seven per cent. 39 These laboratories may lack trained personnel,
particularly when it comes to the latest and hottest technologies. The
sixth reason cited by Professor Moenssens, and in my view the most
important given the appearance of theoretically solid techniques such
as DNA "fingerprinting," is that human error is "a more important factor
than [was] previously suspected."0 A seventh reason is that some
experts manufacture evidence and commit willful perjury.24 This
reason is discussed in more detail later. The eighth reason is that many
of the new techniques yield results that require, or at least invite, further
statistical analysis. 24 2  The forensic technician who is qualified to
conduct a test or procedure may not be sufficiently trained in statistics
to properly evaluate the significance of the results. Forensic witnesses
often give misleading testimony. Finally, for his ninth reason for
"caution," Professor Moenssens argues that in many cases computers
are really doing the analysis by running programs developed outside
of the laboratory and using data bases compiled elsewhere.243 Who
is really doing the analysis?
The following are a few of the more spectacular examples of "junk"
forensic science that prove the professor's points. In United States v.
Ferri,2u the prosecutor wanted to link a pair of shoes found at the
scene of the crime to the defendant.m The prosecutor called a forensic
anthropologist to the stand.2 6 This expert testified that she was able
to compare the "in-shoe" impressions of shoes previously worn by the
defendant to the "in-shoe" impressions in the shoes found at the crime
239. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA As Criminal Identification
Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 303, 324 (1991).
240. Moenssens, supra note 228, at 12-15; see also Jonakait, supra note 235, at 349. An
example of error in statistical calculation was spread before us in the O.J. Simpson case, when
Dr. Bruce Weir, a blue-ribbon statistician and geneticist (tenured, and endowed in some fashion)
was forced to admit that some of his calculations (not critical, except perhaps in the minds
of the jurors) were not totally accurate. He tried his best to blame it on his computer program-or
Mr. Babbage, perhaps. Transcript of proceedings, Friday, June 23, 1995.
241. Moenssens, supra note 228, at 15-18.
242. Id. at 18-20.
243. Id. at 20-21.
244. 778 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1986).
245. Ferri, 778 F.2d at 988.
246. Id.
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scene.2 4 7  Needless to say her opinion was----"same feet."' The
testimony was admitted, the defendant was convicted, and the judge's
ruling was affirmed on appeal." 9 This same expert later gave an
opinion that, based on her examination of a human footprint, the print
was made by a prehistoric woman who was five and a half months
pregnant at the time she made the impression!2 0 Some expert!
In Hooten v. State,251 a case cited by Professor Moenssens, a graphol-
ogist252 was permitted to testify as a questioned documents examin-
er.253 By her own admission, the witness had never "bothered to read
any books on forensic document work, said she did not intend to, and
already knew all she needed to know.
' '254
Perhaps the most chilling example of "junk" is provided by the
infamous Dr. James Grigson, whose metier has been the giving of
psychiatric testimony as to the future dangerous propensities of defendants
in death penalty cases. Commentators have suggested that this sort
of prediction is "so lacking in reliability that it is unethical." 255 The
American Psychiatric Association has reportedly reprimanded Grigson
for claiming 100% accuracy even in cases in which he made no examina-
tion of the defendant. 256 The reader may recall that Grigson's testimony
was attacked in the popular documentary "The Thin Blue Line," which
told of the railroading of Randall Adams on a charge of murdering a
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Mark Hansen, Believe it or Not, 79 A.B.A. J. 64 (June 1993); see also discussion
at infra note 361 (discussing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994)). Richard
Nixon, a true authority on shifty witnesses, made an observation that seems to fit here: "[Tihose
who are lying or trying to cover up something generally make a common mistake--they tend
to overact, to overstate their case." STEPHEN AMBROSE, NIXON: THE EDUCATION OF A POLITICIAN
1913-1962 172 (1987). At the time, Nixon was referring to Alger Hiss. Id. But, what comes
around goes around.
251. 492 So. 2d 948 (Miss. 1986).
252. One who purports to find evidence of a person's character in his handwriting.
253. Hooten, 492 So. 2d at 948.
254. Id. at 958 n.3.
255. Paul C. Giannelli, "Junk Science": The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
105, 114 (1993).
256. Id. at 115.
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police officer in Dallas, Texas. s7 Unfortunately, the United States
Supreme Court has let such testimony pass.' "We are not persuaded
that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable.... [N]either petitioner
nor the Association suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with
respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time."' 2 9 Now there
is a standard for the admissibility of "scientific" evidence!92
Insofar as probabilities evidence26' is concerned, we may also have
to contend with what can only be deliberately misleading arguments
as to the significance of the "numbers." Blood and fluid, DNA, and
hair and fiber evidence is now common in criminal cases. Such evidence
is sometimes referred to as "associative" evidence. The evidence is
offered because it shows some kind of a "match" between some character-
istic of the perpetrator and some characteristic of the defendant. The
prosecutor and defendant frequently express radically different views
as to the importance of the incidence rate of the match. The following
argument provides an example of the "Prosecutor's fallacy": "The
defendant and the perpetrator match on a blood type found in 10% of
the population ... [the prosecutor argues] that there is a 10% chance
the defendant would have this blood type if he were innocent and
therefore... there is a 90% chance he is guilty. 2 62 This is fallacious
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899, 901, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3398, 3398, 77 L. Ed.
2d 1090, 1108, 1109 (1983).
260. Apologists argue that the Court was talking about a constitutional standard, and "was
not determining the appropriate evidentiary standard for admitting such evidence." Lempert,
supra note 46, at 341 n. 108. It is also possible that someone on the court has a sense of humor;
but this is not very likely.
261. For more than you need or want to know about probabilities evidence and related
techniques such as DNA "fingerprinting" see Symposium, Decision and Inference in Litigation,
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 253-1079 (1991). For elementary introductions to the forensic sciences,
see RICHARD SAFERsTEIN, CIMNALISTICs: AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC SCIENCE (5th
ed. 1995); JON ZONDERMAN, BEYOND THE CRIME LAB: THE NEw SCIENCE OF INVESTIGATION
(1990); BADEN wITH HENNESSEE, supra note 13. See generally WuIJAM ECKERT, INTRODUCTION
TO FORENSIC SCmNCES (1996); WILIAM ECKERT & STUART JAMES, INTERPRETATION OF
BLOODSTAIN EVIDENCE AT CRIME SCENES (1989); BARRY A.J. FISHER, TECHNIQUES OF CRIME
SCENE INVESTIGATION (5th ed. 1992); VERNON GEBERTH, PRACrICAL HOMICIDE INVESTIGATION
(2d ed. 1990). The last four books were used in the O.J. Simpson trial.
262. William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence
in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAW
& HUMAN BEHAVIOR 167, 170 (1987).
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reasoning because the argument considers only the associative evi-
dence.263 If the prior probability is low that the defendant is the perpe-
trator (if the case is otherwise very weak), then the associative evidence
may not be nearly so significant.264 But the prosecutor wants to mislead
the jury-to convince the jurors "that they can convict, secure in the
knowledge that error is humanly impossible."
On the "other side of the v." we encounter the "Defense Attorney's
Fallacy." The defense argument is that even if the blood type were
possessed by only one percent of the population, then "in a city of [one]
million there would be approximately 10,000 people with this blood
type" and that the associative evidence is of little value. 2 6 This argu-
ment is based on the fact that "the defendant and the perpetrator both
263. See id. at 170; see also Bernard Robertson & G.A Vignaux, Expert Evidence: Law,
Practice and Probability, 12 OXFORD JL. STUD. 392 (1992) (reviewing TRISTRAM HODGKINSON,
EXPERT EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE (1990) and discussing British cases relating to these
"fallacies").
264. This analysis has something to do with Bayes Theorem, which was developed by Rev.
Thomas Bayes (1744-1809). If statistics make your head hurt, see LARRY GONICK & WOOLLCOT
SMrTH, THE CARTOON GUIDE TO STATISTICS (1993). See also JAMES BROOK, A LAWYER'S
GUIDE TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS (1990).
265. Moenssens, supra note 228, at 20; see also Jonakait, supra note 235, at 345-46. Here
is another spin:
A fingerprint or DNA fragment from the scene of a murder matches that of Mr. Smith.
Newspaper headlines proclaim that the probability of a match with an innocent person
is one in a million, let's say. Yet the more relevant conditional probability is the
likelihood that a person is innocent given that his or her prints match the sample from
the crime scene.
Let's get numerical. Imagine that this crime was committed in a city of approximately
two million people. The year is 2001 and all the city's residents have records of their
DNA or fingerprints on file. Assume further that three residents of the city have prints
that closely match those at the murder scene; in practice, such prints are always a
bit hazy and subject to interpretation. Two of these three people are innocent, the
third guilty. Thus the conditional probability of a print match, given that a person
is innocent, is two out of two million or, equivalently, one in a million. By contrast,
the conditional probability that a person is innocent, given that his prints match those
at the crime scene, is two in three; this latter probability constitutes more than reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence or motive should therefore always be sought to bolster
forensic evidence.
PAULOS, supra note 1, at 72-73 (emphasis omitted). That is, we must look at all of the evidence,
and not the individual pieces of associative evidence. Of course, the defense strategy is to
get the jurors to focus on each piece of evidence in isolation.
266. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 262, at 171.
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belong to such a large group., 267 This argument flooded the airways
during the early coverage of the O.J. Simpson case, with the defense
lawyers and television "experts" arguing that certain matching blood
evidence still left the court with a "football stadium" full of suspects.
Leaving aside the fact that the argument ignored all of the women,
children and huge number of other unlikely candidates that might have
been sitting in this statistical "pleasure dome," the defense argument
also disregarded all the other evidence in the case pointing in Simpson's
direction. This is the way that a jury can be led to undervalue very
strong circumstantial evidence.
One of the most interesting aspects of the "junk science" debate is
the manner in which some of the really "screwball" evidence still gets
admitted, while theoretically sound scientific evidence is excluded.
DNA evidence is a case in point. Like any other scientific evidence,
DNA evidence can be "faked" or "cooked." Legitimate questions may
be raised in any given case about the statistical base that the testifying
expert is using to draw conclusions about the strength of the DNA
match.268 But the fact is that if the tests are run properly, the results
are always highly probative--certainly more compelling than other types
of "evidence" that are now routinely admitted in both civil and criminal
cases.2 69 Granted, there may be risks of overestimation or overvaluation,
267. Cf. id. (citing People v. Robinson, 265 N.E.2d 543,317 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1970), in which
even some appellate judges were taken in by the "Defense Lawyer's Fallacy"). Of course,
many odd arguments were made in the O.J. Simpson case. At one point the defense made
the following statistical argument for the exclusion of evidence relating to past wife-beating:
if there are 2,000,000 wife-beating incidents in the United States annually, and only 2,000
Americans are murdered by their spouses, then the chance that a wife-beater will murder his
wife are 1-in-1,000. Therefore, evidence of wife-beating has almost non-probative value and
should be excluded because the prejudicial effect of its admission (risk of jury misuse or over-
valuing of it?) greatly outweighs its probative value. Now there may be reasons to exclude
such evidence, but the defendant's statistical brief is bogus. Nicole Brown Simpson was murdered.
Therefore, the meaningful statistical question is this: Given the fact that she was one of 2,000
annual victims, what are the odds that she was killed by her battering spouse? "Of the 2,000
such victims per year, one would think that the overwhelming proportion-90% to 99%--are
murdered by those who abused them." Thomas Hazlett, Criminal Justice, REASON, June 1995,
at 58.
268. For an update of the status of DNA testing and accompanying statistical analysis across
the country, see Kathleen W. Berdan, Comment, The Admissibility of DNA Evidence: Minnesota
No Longer Stands Alone, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1063 (1994).
269. It seems to me that DNA evidence is much more scientific and reliable that the witness
of psychology; it is certainly more probative than the stocking top in People v. Adamson, 165
19951
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but these risks can be dealt with short of excluding DNA evidence as
"unreliable." If it is admitted, the opponent can find a "likeable" or
"humble" expert to testify "generally" about abstract contamination or
statistical error rates, suggesting that possibly something might arguably
be amiss.
I am just old enough to remember stories about how paternity cases
were tried in rural Kentucky and Ohio (and may still be for all I know).
The prosecutor in the case would introduce the relatively primitive blood
typing evidence of the day, and then cap it all off with a display of
the infant so that the jury could compare the child's "settled features"
with the defendant's features. Objection overruled! The threshold of
admissibility in criminal cases has been no more demanding. "A brick
is not a wall. 270 After the prosecution had finished, the defense lawyer
would get down to business. He had invariably subpoenaed a number
of youths (selected at random?) with no expectation that they would
appear, and would then make a great show of calling out their names
in the presence of the jury. After each unsuccessful effort to locate
the witness, the cagey lawyer would "comment" that "if [he] were that
young fella, [he] wouldn't come to court either." We can all agree that
this is no "search for truth."
But relatively few realize that what we have right now is a system
that admits in prosecution evidence that is very often of questionable
probative value (handwriting, bite-mark and psychiatric opinion, for
example). Some cases, however, may exclude highly probative and
scientifically sensible prosecution DNA evidence because, when consid-
ered in isolation without regard to the other evidence, it is said to be
less than 100% conclusive. 27' Furthermore, these cases may admit
P.2d 3 (Cal. 1946), or the shotgun in Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S. CL 2562, 33 L.
Ed. 2d 706 (1972), discussed supra at note 26. But then, I am not a judge, let alone a Justice
of the United States Supreme Court.
270. See supra note 27.
271. See Michael Saks & Jonathan Koehler, What DNA "Fingerprinting" Can Teach the
Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDozO L. REv. 361, 362 (1991). Saks and
Koehler state that "[tihe ironic result [of attacks on DNA evidence and a review of it by the
National Academy of Sciences] is that more is known about the strengths and weaknesses of
DNA fingerprinting evidence than about most of the other, older, and more widely used forms
of forensic science evidence." Id. at 362. Elsewhere, the same authors cite data indicating
that forensic document examiners reach the correct result in 45% of the cases, with partial
or complete errors in 36% of the cases, and are unable to draw a conclusion in 19% of the
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defense DNA evidence (in actions for post-conviction relief) in circum-
stances indicative of a false negative.272 An argument case can be
made that an honest dose of Daubert would keep out a lot of "bite-mark-
ology" and graphology opinion, not to mention a lot of the psychological
"repressed memory" and "syndrome" clutter.273
VIII. Prosecutors and Experts
"I could hardly imagine a more damning case," I remarked. "If ever
circumstantial evidence pointed to a criminal it does so here."
"Circumstantial evidence is a very tricky thing," answered Holmes
thoughtfully. "It may seem to point very straight to one thing, but if
you shift your own point of view a little, you may find it pointing in
an equally uncompromising manner to something entirely different."274
What do the ABA Standards for the Prosecution Function have to
say about the relationship between the prosecutor and the expert witness?
3-3.3. Relations with expert witnesses
(a) A prosecutor who engages an expert for an opinion should respect
the independence of the expert and should not seek to dictate the
formation of the expert's opinion on the subject. To the extent necessary,
the prosecutor should explain to the expert his or her role in the trial
as an impartial expert called to aid the fact finders and the manner in
which the examination of witnesses is conducted.
cases. Id. at 372 n.30. Can they beat coin flipping? Can they beat the S&P? Do you want
them to manage your retirement funds? They seem to be managing my retirement funds.
272. Acquittals based on DNA evidence are probably justified-no pun intended-although
one wonders if degradation of the sample, or some extremely odd scenario, might result in
the release of the guilty. See Lempert, supra note 46, at 316-17. Lempert offers the most
bizarre hypothetical yet: a rape victim might have unprotected consensual sex, and then be
raped by someone who wore a condom (a considerate rapist). Lempert, supra note 38, at 341
n.34.
273. Cf. Scheck, supra note 35, at 5, 7 (arguing for exclusion of the lot). See United States
v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994) (excluding expert testimony regarding eyewitnesses
under Dauber). "There is a great deal of suggestibility and there is also a demonstrated significant
degree of confabulation.... With any psychotherapist, there is this incredible degree of trust
and relaxation that it opens the way, it has been demonstrated, for extreme suggestibility for
confabulation." Gary Shaw, Trances, Trials, and Tribulations, 11 TOURO L. REV. 145, 166
(1994); see also Thom Wedlich, Repressed Memories: Unreliable?-Judges in Four Cases
Reject Them Before Trials Start, NAT'L L.., June 12, 1995, at A-7, col. 1.
274. DOYLE, supra note 198, at 65.
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(b) A prosecutor should not pay an excessive fee for the purpose
of influencing the expert's testimony or to fix the amount of the fee
contingent upon the testimony the expert will give or the result in the
case.
27f
The truth is that the prosecutor and the expert more closely resemble
the Cisco Kid and Pancho.176 Consider the revelations of former medi-
cal examiner and now O.J. Simpson consultant Dr. Michael Baden:
i envisioned the office as independent, scientific, apolitical. Pure. Robert
Morgenthau, the district attorney of Manhattan, saw it as an arm of
the DA's office, with a malleable ME doing his bidding. But if the
DA needs a rape in order to prosecute, should the ME somehow find
evidence consistent with a rape? ... What is really wanted is an elastic
man, one who will stretch and bend his findings to suit the DA's needs
and the political climate. Truth and excellence play no part in this
arrangement. Numbers are what count, getting convictions for the DA,
and the ME's office exists for that purpose.2"
This is not especially an American phenomenon. Analyzing the
methods of the Home Office Forensic Science Service, Professor Carol
Jones complains that the pathologist "may be seen as a hired gun of
the State... [w]orking alongside the police [pathologists] become imbued
with police culture., 278 She makes these additional observations, which
I have taken out of order, though not out of context, and rearranged
to make my point. Jones points out that "[florensic science. . . contrib-
utes less to catching criminals than to the assembly of evidence against
known [or at least strongly suspected] perpetrators. 27 9 It is "brought
to bear mainly in order to assemble a case against a known suspect rather
than to sift out cunningly clever criminals from the population at
large."as It is less an "aid to detection" than it is an "arm of convic-
275. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-3.3 (3d ed. 1993).
276. Cecil v. Gibson, 37 Ill. App. 3d 710, 711, 346 N.E.2d 448, 449 (1976). This is my
favorite slam, but it got the case reversed.
277. BADEN WITH HENNESSEE, supra note 13, at 55.
278. JONES, supra note 5, at 1.94-95, 197.
279. Id. at 211. For examples of early works on forensic medicine, see GIOVAN BATrISTA
CODRONCHI, METHODUS TESTIFICANDI (Frankfurt, 1597) (the first important work); ANTOINE
LOUIS, MEMOIRE SUR UNE QUESTION ANATOMIQUE RELATIVE A LA JURISPRUDENCE (Paris,
1763) (differential signs in cases of murder and suicide).
280. JONES, supra note 5, at 212. But see David Schum & Peter Tillers, Marshalling Evidence
for Adversary Litigation, 13 CARDoZO L. REv. 657, 709 (1991) (making the point that scientific,
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tion" and "[o]nce the police choose their case, they are not interested
in knowing about all likely interpretations, but the one which best
fits. ' '282 They may even "pre-select the materials which they wish
to be forensically examined" or "keep back other materials which they
do not wish to be examined." Along the same lines, she contends
that [pathologists] "do not extract from the scene all that it may yield,
but only that which is needed in order to construct a particular case."
a 4
"The selections which inform the expert's work are essentially based
in the adversarial process. '" s Ultimately, the lawyers take over and
run the adversarial process.
Let us put aside the more sinister possibilities suggested by Professor
Jones' observations and consider the hum-drum. Virtually every day,
in every court in the land, questions are put to experts (for the defense
as well as for the prosecution) that invite or allow experts to "fudge."
Elsewhere I have noted that jurors can be misled into believing that
a suggestion that something is "possible" (and favorable to the proponent's
theory of the case) or "consistent" (with the proponent's theory) is the
equivalent of proof-even proof beyond a reasonable doubt.2
or "Baconian," hypothesis testing is not the stuff of police work, except on the rare occasion
"when [the police] have formed an intuitive judgment that someone seen near the scene of
a crime was not involved, and they call upon him or her to come forward in order to be eliminated
from the enquiry" (emphasis added)).
281. JONES, supra note 5, at 211.
282. Id. at 213. Cf. GOODMAN, supra note 26, at 279.
The investigating officers on the case were far too eager to jump to conclusions first
and to try to collect evidence in support of the conclusions afterwards. It would seem
that, in much the same way as they decided upon Wallace's guilt and then concentrated
all their energies upon looking for facts to confirm this impression, they decided that,
since the iron bar [supposedly used to tend the fire, and supposedly used to kill Mrs.
Wallace] was not visible, it was not there [in the hearth---actually it was there all along]
... and if it was not there it was the murdern weapon [the murderer took with him
and disposed of] ... and if it was the murder weapon Wallace must have taken it
with him when he left the house, otherwise it would be visible. Reductio adabsurdum.
It was this sort of logic that caused an innocent man to be arrested; to be convicted;
to come within a hair's breadth of having his neck broken within a hangman's noose.
GOODMAN, supra note 26, at 279.
283. JONES, supra note 5, at 217.
284. Id. at 198.
285. Id. at 213.
286. See Underwood, supra note 28, at 173-74. Consider the testimony of FBI Agent Martz
in the 0i. Simpson case from a defense perspective. Jim Newton & Tim Rutten, Stain's Not
1995]
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"'Consistent with' is one of those catch-all phrases that means
something could be possible. It is used a lot in our profession, especially
on the witness stand when evidence can be interpreted in more than
one way. ''287  Such phraseology has perpetuated many a conspiracy
theory m and has played a role in such notorious cases as that of Sacco
From Preserved Blood, Simpson Jury Told, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1995, Al. Judge Lance Ito
let the defense put this baffled witness on the stand and ask him leading questions. See id.
Martz was adamant that his tests of blood found at the crime scene and at Simpson's home
did not contain EDTA, a preservative contained in test tubes to preserve blood samples. See
id. However, he did agree at one point that one factor taken in isolation was "consistent" with
EDTA. See id. This point was seized upon by the defense as proof that EDTA was there--the
very fact denied by the only witness who tested the blood based on the full spectrum of relevant
factors. See id. This was then equated with proof of a police conspiracy-that blood drawn
and stored in test tube(s) after the murder was later "planted" on items of clothing. See id.
All that was needed was a "blood spatter" expert (who did not testify about "spatter" after
all) and a forensic chemist (who did not test the blood) who was willing to round out the defense
brief by "reinterpreting" Martz's results. See id. Martz was understandably put out. See id.
The defense continued to present expert "evidence" "consistent with" various speculative scenarios
during the testimony of Dr. Henry Lee, Director of the Connecticut State Forensics Laboratory
and part-time freelancer. Jim Newton & Henry Weinstein, Blood-Pattern Expert Bolsters Defense
Simpson Trial: A Second Set of Shoes Could Have Left Marks, Scientist Says, L.A. TIMEs,
Aug. 24, 1995, at Al. This was met by the prosecution in rebuttal on September 15, 1995
when it was pointed out that the possibility that Dr. Lee could not exclude-a (shoe?) "imprint"-
was in fact a tool mark left on concrete when the walkway was built or, in another case, a
print left in the "tile" concrete when it was originally poured. See id. These points were made
during testimony by a special FBI agent who authored a book on the subject. WILLIAM BODiAX,
FOOTWEAR IMPRESSION EVIDENCE (1990). But the damage had been done. Speculative
possibilities have a way of becoming "[un] reasonable doubts." Henry Weinstein & Tim Rutten,
FBI Agent Says Simpson Defense Expert Lee Erred, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1995, at Al. Dr.
Lee's own rebuttal consisted of a news conference in which he issued a rather testy pronouncement
that the trial had become a "game," that his testimony had been misunderstood, and that he
would not "voluntarily" provide further testimony for the defense. See id. But the red herrings
continued to swim into the case as the defense attempted to introduce the testimony of a
disgruntled FBI chemist who was willing to allege that Agent Martz may have shaded testimony
in one or more other cases. See Henry Weinstein & Tim Rutten, Defense Hopes FBI Agent
Can Blunt Expert's Testimony, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1995, at A17 (stating, "Whitehurst, the
mystery witness Simpson's team now wants to call, does not allege that Martz did anything
wrong in the Simpson case").
287. BADEN wrrH HENNESSEE, supra note 13, at 22.
288. Id. at 22. Baden relates his experiences working with the House Committee on
Assassinations during the late 1970s. The Committee's Chief Counsel was convinced that
there was a conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination, that the Mafia was involved, and that
someone had shot at the President from the "grassy knoll." Id. at 20-22. His principle ammunition
for this theory was a tape recording inadvertently made by a Dallas motorcycle cop. Id. He
managed to find some "acoustics experts" who could hear on the tape one or more additional
shots being fired. Id. No one else was able to hear them, but the thought was that there had
to be an additional shooter if there were, in fact, that many shots in the critical time frame.
Id. The experts claimed that they could tell from the analysis of "sound vectors" and the like
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and Vanzetti.2 9 Captain William Proctor, the ballistics expert, testified
as follows:
Q: "Have you an opinion as to whether bullet 3 was fired from the
Colt automatic which is in evidence [Sacco's pistol]?"
A: "I have."
Q: "And what is your opinion?"
A: "My opinion is that it is consistent with being fired by that pis-
tol. ,,
290
Judge Thayer took the bait and in his summation virtually told the
jurors that the expert evidence meant that "it was his [Sacco's] pistol
that fired the bullet that caused the death of Berardelli. ' '291  To this
effect, "the Commonwealth introduced the testimony of two witnesses,
Messrs. Proctor and Van Amburgh. ' 92 Later, Proctor gave an affidavit
that he was never able to find any convincing evidence to support Van
Amburgh's opinion that the bullet was marked with scratches to prove
that it went through Sacco's pistol.293 He also stated that he told the
district attorney that he would answer "no" if he were asked if he had
found any such "affirmative" evidence, but was not asked that ques-
294tion.
that one or more shots had come from the grassy knoll. Id. Baden was asked to testify that
the forensic medical evidence was "consistent" with the acoustics theory. Id. Baden says that
he was convinced that there was nothing to the theory, and he was not called to testify on the
particular point. Id. The questionable theory carried the day. Id. It seems to me that the
prosecution in the O.J. Simpson case might have used that anecdote to their advantage.
289. Commonwealth v. Sacco, 261 Mass. 12, 158 N.E. 167, cert. dismissed, 275 U.S. 574
(1927).
290. HERBERT B. EHRMANN, THE CASE THAT WILL NOT DIE: COMMONWEALTH V. SACCO
& VANZErrI 266 (1969) (citing the HOLT RECORD vol. IV, 3641, 3643).
291. Id. at 268 (citing the HOLT RECORD, vol. III, 3422).
292. Id.
293. See EHRMAN, supra note 290, at 270; FELIx FRANKFuRTER, THE CASE OF SACCO
AND VANzETn: A CRrICAL ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS AND LAYMEN 77, 78-79 (1927) (Universal
Library ed. 1962); see also BRIAN JACKSON, THE BLACK FLAG: A LOOK BACK AT THE STRANGE
CASE OF NICOLA SACCO AND BARTOLOMEO VANZETrI 22-23, 54, 107 (1981).
294. Jackson, supra note 293, at 54. On the other hand, tests run in 1961 suggest that
the bullet was fired through Sacco's gun, if we assume that the gun and the bullets tested were
the originals! Id. at 107, 132. This supports the theory held by some that Sacco was guilty
but Vanzetti was not. In any event, the trial was not fair "by today's standards." Massachusetts
Governor Michael Dukakis' Proclamation of August 23, 1977, "intending to remove any stigma
and disgrace from Sacco and Vanzetti," stated that this was a case in which the prosecution
1995]
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Baden provides an excellent (precisely because it is somewhat
mundane) example of how coaching and clever questioning by a prosecu-
tor might mislead jurors, and invite them to draw false inferences. 295
[T]he assistant DA, who was on his first homicide case, thought it was
a rape and also thought the jury would be more likely to convict if it
was. ... [But the facts ruled out rape]. At [the] trial for murder, the
prosecution asked [the ME] if her findings were "consistent with" rape.
She said yes. [The] defense lawyer didn't have the presence of mind
to ask her if her findings were also consistent with its not being rape
[for example, the victim's hymen was intact]. [The defendant] was
convicted and put away.296
Professor Jones discusses a number of celebrated British cases that
raise questions about the relationship between the prosecutor and the
state's expert. These cases include the "IRA Bombing Cases,, 297 the
case of the "Guilford Four,, 298 the "Maguire Seven,"2 99 and the "Bir-
mingham Six. ' '3°° I discuss several of the less celebrated cases in
her collection herein.
In the Confait case, three boys were convicted. One was convicted
of murder, one was convicted of manslaughter, and all three were
convicted of arson for setting fire to the deceased, Maxwell Confait's,
house.30 ' The convictions were quashed in 1975. 3 2 One of the
problems with the case, which was explored in the Fisher Inquiry of
knowingly used false testimony [Proctor's] in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,
79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959), the ABA Code of Professional Conduct, and the ABA
Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, with particular reference to Standard
3.3. Id. at 185-87.
295. See BADEN wri HENNESSEE, supra note 13, at 60-61.
296. Id. This type of testimony can obviously be very useful to the defense in criminal
cases, which deal in "possibilities." See Underwood, supra note 28, at 173. For example,
in the "preppie murder" case, in which the defendant Chambers claimed that he killed his girlfriend
accidently during "rough sex," defense counsel was able to recruit a Los Angeles medical examiner
to testify that the defendant's account was "consistent" with the victim's injuries. See Marcia
Chambers, Experts Need To Put Their House In Order, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18, 1988, at 13.
297. JONES, supra note 5, at 250-51.
298. Id. at 251-52.
299. Id. at 252-60.
300. Id. at 261-68.
301. Id. at 225.
302. JONES, supra note 5, at 225.
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1977, was the way the prosecution got its expert witness to stretch the
period during which death could have occurred in order to overcome
an alibi defense. a 3 The pathologist originally put the time of death
at 6:30 p.m., roughly nine hours before he had been called to the scene
of the crime.304 By the time he had started the post-mortem at 6:30
a.m., rigor mortis was complete, "which suggested death twelve hours
earlier.' ' 305 One of the boys had an alibi that covered the period during
which the pathologist estimated that the victim probably died.306 The
prosecutor, identified by Jones as a Richard Du Cann, 30'7 having con-
ferred with the pathologist and asked him questions about ways in which
the period for the time of death could be extended after midnight,
introduced evidence that "overstated the uncertainty of the estimates
of the time of death, and which over-rode the actual estimates which
[the pathologists gave]." 308 In the final argument to the jury, the prose-
cution suggested that death had occurred after midnight.309 "The prose-
cution had, therefore, not only censored certain facts, but it had also
deliberately rendered some facts indeterminate in order to obtain a
conviction." 30 Actually, Jones attempted to prove that the pathologist
was not given all of the evidence he needed, and to that extent the case
was one which might be characterized by insufficient "closeness" between
the prosecutor and the expert.31' She also points out that the patholo-
gist's examination of the victim was somewhat "structured."31 2 Because
the police had apparently informed him that Confait was a known
homosexual, and that they suspected that he had been engaged in
homosexual intercourse shortly before death, the pathologist had not
303. Id. at 225-26.
304. Id. at 226.
305. Id. Cf. BADEN wrra HENNESSEE, supra note 13, at 37 (stating that "[r]igor mortis
begins to show two hours after death and takes twelve hours to peak").
306. JONES, supra note 5, at 225.
307. Id. at 226.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 226-27.
311. JONES, supra note 5, at 229.
312. Id.
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taken the rectal temperature of the body.313 The best way to determine
the time of death is by considering such temperature, or algor mortis.3 4
As a general rule, body temperature drops about one degree each hour
after death.3' But a pathologist will not take a rectal temperature
under the circumstances suggested here.3 "
Even more interesting are what Jones calls the Dr. Clift Cases,
particularly Preece v. HM Advocate,317 which superficially looks like
an American case discussed in a later section in connection with the
saga of West Virginia State Police Officer Fred Zain. Preece had been
convicted of the strangulation murder of Helen Wills. 3 s The prosecu-
tion theory was that Preece had sex with Wills in the cab of his truck
and had killed her during or after the act.319 The case consisted of
fibers found in the truck bearing similarities to fibers in Wills' coat,
a brown hair on her coat that was similar to Preece's, and blood-semen
evidence.32 ° Semen stains found on the victim indicated a type A
secretor.32' Preece was a type A secretor.322 However, the Crown's
expert, Dr. Clift, did not reveal to the Court that the victim was also
type A, with a one-in-three chance of being a secretor-plenty of "reason-
able doubt. '' 32 Clift's testimony was not exactly the whole truth.
Preece was only one of a number of cases in which Clift's work was
reviewed, questioned, and in some cases condemned as unsatisfactory.32
313. Id. at 228-29.
314. Id. at 228.
315. See BADEN wrrH HENNESsEE, supra note 13, at 38.
316. JONES, supra note 5, at 228-29. The pathologist could have, but did not, take the
body temperature through the abdomen. Id. at 229.
317. CRIM. L. REv. 783-5 (1981) (High Court of Justiciary, Edinburgh); see JONES, supra
note 5, at 230-37.
318. JONES, supra note 5, at 230.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See JONES, supra note 5, at 230. Actually, what is more odd is the fact that an appointed
defense expert later admitted that he had known that the victim was a type A, and probably
a secretor, but that the defense counsel had not asked him to give evidence on that point!
Id. at 235-36.
324. JONES, supra note 5, at 246-47.
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Clift was retired, and of 1,500 of his cases that were reviewed, 129 in
detail, sixteen were returned to the court of appeal. 32s But only eleven
cases were actually reviewed by the court of appeals, and only four
convictions were ultimately reversed.326 The results of the investigation
were troubling, but otherwise hard to characterize.327
Clearly, even a well intentioned expert employing good science can
be a problem when he is in the hands of a prosecution team that is willing
to withhold evidence. I went to law school after a too lengthy stint
in the army, and one of the cases that I remember studying in Evidence
was United States v. Stifel,328 a federal appellate decision approving
the admission of Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA).329 Stifel had
been convicted of sending a bomb to and killing one Daniel Ronec.3a
The prosecutor's theory was that Stifel, age 21, had been "jilted" by
his girlfriend, Cheryl Jones, who then became engaged to Ronec, age
24.33' The bomb, which had been contained in a cardboard mailing
tube, was delivered to the home of Daniel Ronec's mother.332 The
bomb exploded and killed Daniel when he unscrewed a metal lid on
the end.333
At Stifel's trial, it was assumed that the container had been addressed
to Daniel Ronec, although the mailman who testified to the fact was
uncertain.3a Circumstantial evidence suggested that Stifel might have
had some knowledge of bombmaking, but the really significant evidence
against him came in the form of expert testimony.33 s Stifel worked
at Proctor & Gamble (P&G) in Cincinnati, Ohio for a period before
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Ia. at 247-48.
328. 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970).
329. Stifel, 433 F.2d at 435.
330. Id. at 431.
331. Id. at 432.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. United States v. Stifel, 594 F. Supp. 1525, 1529 (N.D. Ohio 1984). The prosecution
was unable to prove this fact because the address label had been destroyed along with the rest
of the bomb. Id. at 1529.
335. Stifel, 433 F.2d at 434.
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and after the bombing.3 A storeroom no more than 100 feet from
his work area contained mailing labels, cardboard tubes, and metal lids
of the type used in constructing the bomb.337 Government experts
testified that these materials were "microscopically similar" to [consistent
with?] fragments found at the scene of the bombing.3I Expert James
Scott also testified that NAA analysis proved that the fragments of metal,
tape, and mailing label were of the same type and manufacture as those
taken from the P&G storeroom. 339 Indeed, he testified that tape and
metal in the storeroom were from the same batch as fragments of tape
and metal recovered from the bomb scene, and that particular batch
of tape had only been distributed to two businesses: P&G and another
Cincinnati company!34" Questioning of Cheryl Jones also left the
impression that Stifel had in some way made some threats to kill
Ronec.34x The prosecutor's summation stressed that Stifel was the
only person who could have committed the crime, and comments made
to the jury by the judge when the jurors initially announced that they
were deadlocked emphasized that, in the court's opinion, "no more or
clearer evidence could be produced on behalf of either side.
' '3 2
Stifel was convicted in 1969 and served his sentence from 1969 until
he was paroled in 19 8 0 .3 He had filed an action to vacate, set aside,
or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in 1977, and had also
sought information through the Freedom of Information Act (FOI), 5
U.S.C. § 552.14 The government resisted the FOI request for over
a year but finally coughed up 1,800 pages of information that suggested
the prosecution had suppressed key evidence and may have knowingly
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 436.
340. Stifel, 594 F. Supp. at 1531.
341. Stifel, 433 F.2d at 433. Jones testified that Stifel had told her over the telephone that
he had been on his way to Columbus to shoot her and whoever she was with. Id. However,
he told her that the authorities had picked him up while he was en route. Id.
342. Stifel, 594 F. Supp. at 1531.
343. Id. at 1528.
344. Id.
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presented perjured testimony. 34 In 1984 a district court judge vacated
the conviction. 346 Insofar as the "suppressed evidence" allegations
were concerned, the court concluded that the government withheld
evidence that the real killer may have been Daniel Ronec's father,
Andrew, who spelled his name Hronec or Roen. 347 Indeed, the evidence
against this rather violent-tempered individual and his threats against
his ex-wife (Daniel's mother) was relatively compelling when compared
to the thin circumstantial case against Stifel. 34 The evidence further
showed that the government had not turned over statements by Cheryl
Jones in which she had strongly stated that she had no reason to suspect
Stifel and that he had never made any threats against Ronec.349
Furthermore, while the government's glittering array of incriminating
facts had included a mail order catalog found in Stifel's room which
offered for sale a switch like that used in the manufacture of the
bomb,3's the government did not reveal that all leads had been exhausted
and that there was no evidence that Stifel had ever made such a purchase
from the catalog, or from any other source.3s1 The jury was permitted
to draw the false inference that he had purchased a switch from the
catalog. The judge concluded that the Scott testimony was not perjury
because "it was not false or materially misleading. . . . [T]he answers
given by Scott were responsive to the questions asked and ... Scott
believed to a reasonable scientific certainty that the bomb scene and
the P&G tapes were from the same batch."" 2 On the other hand,
the court did conclude that the undisclosed results of certain tests
performed by Scott on tape obtained from another source could have
been used to "further impeach the credibility of Scott's scientific meth-
ods.' ' 5
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Stifel, 594 F. Supp. at 1531.
348. Id. at 1532.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1535.
351. Id. at 1532.
352. Stifel, 594 F. Supp. at 1542-43 (footnote omitted).
353. Id. at 1543.
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Stifel's conviction was vacated, and he went on to obtain a law
degree.3s4 While he was in law school he won a moot court (appellate
argument) competition arguing for the admissibility of expert testimony
regarding the rape trauma syndrome!3s5 What Dr. Watson once said
of another case seems to fit, in an odd sort of way: "The crime was
of interest in itself, but that interest was as nothing to me compared
to the inconceivable sequel....
Of particular interest is a new opinion in the never ending case of
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons.357 In this case, Stephen Buckley, a murder
defendant, brought a federal civil rights action (42 U.S.C. § 1983) for
monetary damages against his prosecutors and others.358 He alleged
that the prosecutors "coerced" others to falsely finger him, paid them
for false statements incriminating him, and also shopped around until
they could find an expert who was willing to support the false theory
that a footprint on the victim's door matched a pair of boots that Buckley
had voluntarily provided to investigators. 359 The prosecutor's expert
was an anthropologist who proved to be a "controversial witness"--an
expert whom we have already noted is famous for her opinion regarding
the footprints of a prehistoric woman.3°
Buckley may become the "Bleak House" of 1983 litigation, as it has
kept running up and down the hierarchy of federal courts.3 61 In the
354. See JACK WEINSTEIN ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 386 (8th ed. 1988).
355. See id.
356. SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Adventure of the Empty House, in THE RETURN
OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 11 (The Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. 1991).
357. 509 U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993).
358. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2609.
359. Id. at 2610.
360. See discussion supra note 248.
361. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994). The district court's judgment
in favor of Buckley's prosecutors went to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part, vacated
in part, and remanded. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1990). This decision
was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which vacated the decision and remanded
the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 502
U.S. 801, 112 S. Ct. 40, 116 L. Ed. 2d 19 (1991), affid, 952 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1992). This
decision was again taken to the Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded, so that the appellate
court could issue this opinion. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, __ U.S. _, 113 S. Ct. 53, 121
L. Ed. 2d 23 (1992). This history of the case is taken from the headnotes in Fitzsimmons,
20 F.3d 789. It appears that the Supreme Court had reversed the Seventh Circuit's opinion
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latest opinion issued by a panel of the Seventh Circuit, the majority
gave the claims rather short shrift, noting, inter alia, that
[t]he exchange of money for information may be a regrettable way of
securing evidence, but it is common. So too with promises to go
easy.... [But]... this practice... [does not] violate] the Constitution.
Concealing the payments at trial would have violated his rights; a
defendant is entitled to know what the prosecutor paid for a statement
(whether in cash or in lenience and related promises) so that he may
expose to the jury the witness's shortcomings and bias. ... Buckley
does not allege concealment at trial, which would in any event be
comfortably within the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity....
Coercing witnesses to speak rather than loosening their tongues by
promises of reward, is a genuine constitutional wrong, but the persons
aggrieved would be Cruz and Hernandez rather than Buckley ...
[Insofar as the allegedly false expert testimony is concerned,]... because
the prosecutors obtained Robbins's assessment of the bootprint during
the investigatory rather than [during the] prosecutorial stage of the case,
they are not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity .... [But]
[n]either shopping for a favorable witness nor hiring a practitioner of
junk science is actionable, although it may lead to devastating cross-
examination if the judge permits the witness to testify. ... The prosecu-
tor's discussions with Robbins did not injure Buckley; only the decision
to file charges and proffer her testimony, coupled with the judge's
decision that she was qualified to offer expert testimony, did so ...
A person aggrieved by proposed expert testimony may ask the judge
to exclude it, and may appeal from an adverse judgment, but may not
collect damages from the lawyers who recruited the witness '2
A dissenting judge argued that the gist of the complaint was that
the prosecutors had "manufactured the bootprint evidence" and had
"suborned perjury," and that the injury allegedly caused by this miscon-
duct was an unnecessary and unjustified indictment and possibly a
trial.363 This, reasoned the judge, cannot sensibly be considered advoca-
cy, and cannot justly be cloaked in prosecutorial immunity.364
at 113 S. Ct. 2606 and remanded. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, __ U.S.__ 113 S. Ct. 2606,
125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993), 61 U.S.L.W. 4713. A motion for rehearing en banc was denied
by the Seventh Circuit on June 7, 1994, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 13888.
362. Buckley, 20 F.3d at 794-96.
363. Id. at 800.
364. Id.
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IX. Perjury, False Statements,
and the Threat of "Malpractice"
Only a few years ago the conventional wisdom held that it would
be extremely unlikely that an expert witness would ever be convicted
of perjury. To be sure, an expert might be embarrassed for holding
to a foolish and unsubstantiated opinion; and every once in a while an
expert-maybe even a complete imposter-was caught lying about his
credentials. '  But it was rare for an expert to be charged with perjury
and rarer still for an expert to be convicted of perjury because he gave
an opinion that was not honestly held.3 " But the high stakes of toxic
tort, drug liability, and medical devices litigation has spawned a lot of
charges, if no convictions. 67  In one celebrated case involving the
Dalkon Shield, IUD, a defense expert was indicted for perjury after
a panel of Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals judges overturned a defense
verdict on the ground that the expert had, in their view, testified falsely
about having performed certain experiments.-u  However, the expert
was acquitted, and the appellate court thereafter vacated its earlier opinion
365. See, e.g., Trapp v. American Trading & Production Corp., 414 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1979). See also Witness's False Credentials Nix Punitive Damages Award, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 29, 1988, at 48 (reporting that the Eleventh Circuit vacated an arbitrator's award
of punitive damages against a securities firm on the ground that the customers' expert had
presented false credentials).
366. See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 24 N.J. 18, 130 A.2d 610 (1957). Sullivan is frequently
cited as the rare case in which an expert was convicted of perjury. On the other hand, this
case is a troubling one in which the perjurious testimony was elicited in a free-for-all of cross
and redirect examination. See State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 67 A.2d 298 (1949). The hearing
in which the testimony was given was the second trial of the "Trenton Six." See id. The theory
of the prosecution was that Dr. Sullivan, who had been called by the state to testify as to the
voluntariness of the defendants' confessions, had
after the first trial [which resulted in a conviction that was later reversed] ... directed
himself toward securing freedom for the murder defendants and to this end willfully
falsified his testimony at the second trial in attempting to establish that the defendants
were incompetent at the time they had executed their respective confessions.
Sullivan, 130 A.2d at 613. See generally Annotation, Statement of Belief or Opinion as Perjury,
66 A.L.R.2d 791 (1959).
367. See generally Suits, Indictments, Countersuits Spawned By Allegations of False Expert
Testimony, 2 BNA Toxics L. Rep. 47, Apr. 27, 1988, at 1314.
368. See Harre v. A.H. Robbins Co., 750 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1985).
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and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. 369
In a rarely publicized case, lawyers from the United States Justice Depart-
ment were sanctioned-fined-for obstructing their opponent's efforts
to uncover perjury by a EPA on-site coordinator in an environmental
"Superfund" case!370 The court described the culprit as "a man who
has misrepresented his academic credentials and achievements throughout
his career and subsequent to this case was convicted of perjury, specifical-
ly making material false declarations in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1623. -37'
The ground has gotten bloody of late with judges, lawyers, and experts
trading blows;3 72 lawyers and experts squabbling and pointing fingers
in the wake of courtroom disasters;373 and experts striking back with
defamation suits. 374 Will there be changes, as scientific evidence comes
under a greater degree of scrutiny, particularly in criminal cases?
In 1987, Glen Woodall was convicted in West Virginia for multiple
offenses including rape. 75 The conviction was procured largely on
the strength of the testimony of Officer Fred Zain, a forensic scientist
working for the West Virginia State Police.376 Zain opined that semen
recovered from the victims yielded blood traits that were identical to
Woodall's and that these traits would occur in only six out of 10,000
males in West Virginia.3 7 The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Appeals in 1989,378 but was ultimately overturned in 1992
when DNA testing proved that he could not have been the perpetrator. 79
369. See Harre v. A.H. Robbins Co., 866 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir. 1989).
370. See United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 158 F.R.D. 80 (S.D. W. Va. 1994).
371. Id. at 84.
372. E.g., Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 760 F. Supp. 1410 (D. Kan. 1991) (involving an effort
to disqualify Judge Kelly before retrial of case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)).
373. See Mill Owner Estimates Cleanup at $40 Million After Judge Decides Former Owner's
Liability, BNA Toxics Law Daily, Aug. 1, 1991, at 5.
374. On litigation between William McBride, Science Magazine, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
and others see McBride v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 800 F.2d 1208 (1986).
375. See State v. Woodall, 182 W. Va. 15, 385 S.E.2d 253 (1989).
376. See Woodall, 385 S.E.2d at 256-59.
377. Id. at 261.
378. Id. at 265.
379. In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 190 W. Va.
321, 329, 438 S.E.2d 501, 509 (1993).
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Civil litigation initiated by Woodall after his release resulted in a $1
million settlement. It also led to an investigation of Zain and of his
work as Chief of Serology at the State Police Crime Laboratory.3
This investigation not only generated a report that painted a picture of
Professor Moenssens' worst case scenario, but also led to a criminal
referral to the United States Attomey.3 1
According to the report, the operating procedures of the serology
laboratory were deficient in the following particulars:
[1] no written documentation of testing methodology; [2] no written
quality assurance program; [3] no written internal or external auditing
procedures; [4] no routine proficiency testing of laboratory technicians;
[5] no technical review of work product; [6] no written documentation
of instrument maintenance and calibration; [7] no written testing proce-
dures manual; [there was] [8] [a] failure to follow generally-accepted
scientific testing standards with respect to certain tests; [9] inadequate
record-keeping; and [10] [a] failure to conduct collateral testing.3"
These deficiencies "undoubtedly contributed to an environment within
which Zain's misconduct escaped detection. " 3  The specific acts
of misconduct by the "pro-prosecution" Zain were enumerated as follows:
[1] overstating the strength of results; [2] overstating the frequency of
genetic matches on individual pieces of evidence; [3] misreporting the
frequency of genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence; [4] reporting
that multiple items had been tested, when only a single item had been
tested; [5] reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; [6] repeatedly
altering laboratory records; [7] grouping results to create the erroneous
impression that genetic markers had been obtained from all samples
tested; [8] failing to report conflicting results; [9] faiing to conduct
or to report conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting results;
[10] implying a match with a suspect when testing supported only a
match with the victim; and [11] reporting scientifically impossible or
improbable results.3"
380. See In re Investigation, 438 S.E.2d at 501-20.
381. Id. at 501.
382. Id. at 504.
383. Id. at 517. At the time of this writing Zain still faces trials in Texas and West Virginia.
See Texas Lawyer, Apr. 3, 1995, at 2.
384. In re Investigation, 438 S.E.2d at 516.
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The report provides details on a number of suspicious cases, among
them the rape conviction in State v. Davis,m which was affirmed
in a reported 1988 opinion of the high court. According to that opinion,
both the defendant and the victim of the rape had type 0 blood.-
Vaginal swabs taken from the victim showed seminal fluid containing
the characteristics of both type A and type 0 blood.387 The defendant's
expert, a clinical pathologist (a doctor), testified that seminal stains on
exhibits found at the crime scene exhibited type A characteristics.88
If this expert had been credited, the jury could only have concluded
that the defendant was not the perpetrator. Zain effectively countered
this defense evidence by opining that
his testing of unstained areas of the exhibits also revealed type A
characteristics, leading him to conclude that the presence of those
characteristics in the seminal stains was the result of a false reading
due to bacterial contamination and that the genetic markers found in
the seminal stains were not inconsistent with those found in the appellant's
blood.3
This was good enough for the jury, and was good enough for the appellate
court, which could "find no manifest inadequacy in the evidence which
would warrant ... reversal of the conviction. . . ,390 The investigative
report of Zain's misconduct notes that there was "no satisfactory founda-
tion for [Zain's] opinion ... in the laboratory records [or] the transcript
of testimony.,
391
Long before the completion of the court ordered investigation of
the crime lab, Zain had left for a new job in Texas. The controversy
followed him. Now it seems that he will be prosecuted for perjury:
On July 22, Zain was indicted on three counts of perjury in West Virginia.
... Four days later, he was indicted on perjury, record-tampering and
evidence-fabricating in Texas. ... In West Virginia, Zain is accused
385. 180 W. Va. 357, 376 S.E.2d 563 (1988).
386. Davis, 376 S.E.2d at 567.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 568.
391. In re Investigation, 438 S.E.2d at 516.
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of lying about his academic credentials, his fees and a test he said he
had performed on evidence found at the scene of a 1989 double murder.
... In Texas, he is charged with falsifying the results of a DNA test
to implicate a suspect in a 1990 rape case.3
The Zain case is not unique. In Texas, Ralph Erdmann, a pathologist
for forty-two counties, recently pled no contest to charges that he faked
autopsies. 3  This has apparently thrown doubt on convictions in as
many as twenty capital cases in which he gave testimony.39 Erdmann
was convicted and given ten years probation.39s At least one capital
case in which he gave evidence has been reversed.39  In addition,
Andre Moenssens alludes to a rogue's gallery that includes a police
lieutenant who faked fingerprints, 397 an FBI agent who lied about his
credentials and committed perjury about tests he never conducted, and
a laboratory that faked results.39s
Some suggest that a civil lawsuit might straighten out these experts.
On the other hand, as we saw in Buckley, expert witnesses and their
lawyers have traditionally been given immunity for testimony presented
in court.3 99 There have been some inroads when the expert's own
392. Mark Hansen, Police Serologist Accused of Perjury, 80 A.B.A. J. Sept. 1994, at 39.
393. Don DeBenedictis, Off-Target Opinions, 80 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 76, 77.
394. Id.
395. Gary Taylor, Fake Evidence Becomes RealProblem, NAT'LL.J., Oct. 9, 1995, at A28.
396. Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
397. Moenssens, supra note 228, at 1. Another curious book claims that fingerprints can
be faked with the aid of a copier:
The toner clings to the image on an electrostatic drum, and a heating element fuses
the toner to the paper. The trick is to place a suspect's fingerprint card on the platen
and make a copy of it, but with the heater disconnected. This leaves a non-fused image
on the paper copy, and it's possible to "lift" one of the non-fused fingerprint images
with tape.
BART ROMMEL, DIRTY TRICKS COPS USE (AND WHY THEY USE THEM) 120 (1993). Another
author alludes to fingerprint faking by a New York state trooper. Taylor, supra note 395, at
A28.
398. See Moenssens, supra note 228, at 16.
399. See Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens Assoc. Eng'r., 113 Wash. 2d 123, 776 P.2d 666 (1989).
See supra notes 357-64 (discussing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994)).
But compare Murphy v. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671 (1992) (malpractice case allowing damages
against an expert witness for negligence in miscalculating a damage claim on the theory that
the work did not involve testimony but rather pretrial litigation support services); Chandler
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client has sued the expert,4w but it seems unlikely that many courts
will permit an opposing party to sue an expert hired by the other side.41
v. United States, 875 F. Supp. 1250 (ND. Tex. 1994). In Chandler, two government employees
who had been wrongfully charged with perjury (18 U.S.C. § 1623) and obstruction of justice
(18 U.S.C. § 1512) sued the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for malicious
prosecution, attributable to the misconduct of an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA)
and a GSA investigator. Chandler, 875 F. Supp. at 1250. Although the court criticized the
AUSA (the prosecution) for a lack of investigation and oversight, these deficiencies were held
not to be actionable because of the "discretionary function exception" to the FTCA. Id. at
1253. However, the Government was held liable on the theory that the AUSA's lapse permitted
the GSA investigator to "play an inflated role in the prosecution" and "present as fact his own
biased assumptions." Id. Critical to the decision was what the court characterized as "the
investigator's intentionally false, misleading and incomplete testimony to the grand jury" that
indicted the plaintiffs. Id.
400. See DeBenedictis, supra note 393, at 79 (discussing Mattco Forge Inc. v. Arthur Young
& Co., 5 Cal. App. 4th 392 (1992)).
401. Cf. Brisco v. La Hue, 460 U.S. 325, 369, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1133, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96,
129 (1983) (holding that a police officer who committed perjury is immune in suits brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994) with
Panitz v. Behrend, 429 Pa. Super. 273, 632 A.2d 562 (1993) (discussed in De Benedictis supra
note 393, at 77, which stated that a disappointed plaintiff would not have a case against its
own expert if the expert only.told the truth).
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